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MAKING A SOLDIER



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Making a Soldier

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM A. PEW


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COLONEL OF THE LATE EIGHTH MASS. INF., U. S. V.



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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The Training School, Massachusetts National Guard, has been in operation four years. The School was established to fit young men to become subalterns in the militia after a two years' course of study and training. The course includes a camp of instruction held for three days in the autumn, and for a week in the summer of each year; also monthly conferences during the winter, at which the cadets are assembled for a twenty-four hour period of instruction. In connection with the conferences there is a correspondence school. One student is chosen yearly from every military organization in the state.

The following lectures were given informally to the cadets of the Training School at the monthly conferences; as they were not originally intended for publication, no attempt was made to preserve the various sources from which some of the matter was taken. The author regrets the impossibility of determining how much has been borrowed from better writers and scholars.

WILLIAM A. PEW.

Salem, Massachusetts. September, 1917.

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INTRODUCTION

Shortly before the American Revolution, Timothy Pickering wrote a drill regulation for the use of the militia. In the introduction he said: "To remedy the want of experience, as much as possible the militia should be let into the ground and reason of every action and movement." The purpose of these talks is to let you into the ground and reason of military education.

The kind of soldier that interests us is one who finds satisfaction in serving a cause, and who has learned to expend his energies to the best advantage for that cause. He must be physically developed, trained to conserve health, and he must perform with technical skill his part in every incident. Besides these qualifications, he must have the mind of a soldier.

We wish you to know how the mind of a soldier is attained, and what there is in human nature out of which it is built. In reference to this phase of soldier-making I intend, so far as I am able, to let you into the ground and reason of the training which produces such a mind.

To attain the right kind of mind is the important step. There is an ideal mind, which is characterized by a tendency to correct action and supreme satisfaction in such action.

This doing and feeling is shot through and through with energy, abandon, restraint, and sentiments of loyalty. The training of mind and body for correct feeling and action is the important part of military education. Much of correct action depends upon acquiring correct habits, but the emotional tone, which furnishes most of the driving force of our activities, comes from cultivating and training our inherited habits, which are called instincts. There is undoubtedly an intellectual satisfaction in doing what we consider right, but, with most men, the main satisfaction comes from the functioning of instincts. The farmer who keeps a dog to protect his premises trains the animal to certain habits, but he relies principally upon the nature of the beast. To a larger extent a nation trains its fighting force in correct military habits, but the energy of a soldierly mind comes, in a large measure, from human nature. We shall, in these talks, discuss soldier-making in connection with habits and human nature.

MAKING A SOLDIER

MAKING A SOLDIER

I

THE EFFECT OF DISCIPLINE

WE begin this course of lectures by reciting a few horrible examples of the low efficiency of militia and afterwards let you into the ground and reason of these failures. A few contrasts between disciplined and untrained masses illustrate what every soldier ought to know.

Fritz Reuter describes a rising of the Mecklenburg peasants in 1813 against the French in "*Ut de Franzosentid*":—

"The Landsturm (levée en masse) was called out; the Herr Amtshauptmann commanded in chief, and, under him, Captain Grischow.

"A single French regiment would have driven the whole pack like chaff before the wind, say the would-be-wise. It may be so. On one and the same day the cry went through the whole of lower Germany from the Vistula to the Elbe, from the Baltic to Berlin, 'The French are com-

ing!

"The Stemhagen folk marched on Ankershagen; the French were said to be in Ankershagen. The Malchin folk marched on Stemhagen; the French were said to be in Stemhagen. Yes, it was a queer medley. In the market-place at Stemhagen the pike-men were divided into companies; Droz and the miller were to manage them because they were the only ones who understood anything about war; but the burghers would not obey their commands, because the one was a Frenchman and the other a miller. Nobody would stand in the rear rank. Deichert, the shoemaker, objected because Bank stood in the front; Groth, the tax-gatherer, because Stahl the weaver, who was in the front, always sent the reverse end of the pike into his ribs in leveling bayonets, and he could not put up with it.

"At last they were all beautifully in rank and file, and when Captain Grischow commanded, 'Left wheel,' out they came into the Brandenburg road, and marched on in a splendid heap of confusion; and when they were outside the town gates, everyone looked for a dry path for himself, and they marched one behind the other, like geese among the barley. A halt was made at the Owl Hill to wait for their commander, the Herr Amtshauptmann. The Herr Amtshauptmann was too old to walk, and he could not ride, so he

drove to battle; stately he sat in his long basket-carriage with his sword lying by his side. When he arrived he received a 'Vivat' from his troops; and then he made them a speech, and said: 'My children! We are not soldiers, and we shall make plenty of blunders, but that will do no harm. Whoever likes to laugh, may do so. But we will do our duty, and our duty is to show the French that we are at our post. It's a pity that I know nothing about the art of war, but I will look out in good time for a man who does—Herr Droz, come up here by my side, and when the enemy comes, tell me what I am to do. I will not forsake you, my children. And now forward, for the Fatherland!

" 'Hurrah!' cried his people, and away they went against the enemy. The cavalry was sent out to reconnoiter, and rode in front, and Inspector Brasig and the Ivenack town clerk had pistols; these they fired off every now and then, probably to frighten the French, and in this way they reached Ankershagen, but they did not meet the French. When this was reported to the Herr Amtshauptmann, he said: 'Children, it seems to me that we have done enough for to-day, and if we go back at once, we shall be home again by daylight. What say you, eh?'

"The idea was good. Captain Grischow commanded, 'Right about face,' and they all went

home except half a company of pikes, and two fowling pieces, who fell upon the Kittendorf public house and there did wonders.

"As they were marching back, Stahl came up to the Amtshauptmann and asked, 'By your leave, Herr Amtshauptmann, may I lay my pike in your carriage for a little while?'

" 'Certainly.'

"Then Deichert came, and Zachow came, and many came, and at last all came, with the same request; and by the time the Herr Amtshauptmann drove into the town, his innocent basket-carriage looked like an engine of war, like some scythe-chariot out of the Persian and Roman times.

"Rathsherr Herse just let a corps of sharpshooters fire 'at 'em' three times in the market-place, and then every one went home quite satisfied. My uncle alone was dissatisfied. 'Heinz,' he said again to his adjutant, 'there's no good in all this.' "

Compare the above experience to the marching of the Third German Army Corps in the campaign of 1870, after the German nation had been trained for fifty years to arms:

"When Prince Frederick Charles took over the command of this corps, he compelled the men to wear their packs all through the drill season, in peace times. The men accordingly were accustomed to march considerable distances bearing

heavy weights on their backs. Their muscles were hardened, and they could withstand the fatigue of the march without experiencing any serious discomfort. I stopped at the entrance of the village and saw them pass; although it was the middle of a hot day, there was no suggestion of straggling. Regiment after regiment went by without a wave in the uniform rate of marching. Step was not maintained, but each man forged ahead, marching at ease, maintaining his distance and interval in the endless column. The impression was of the onward movement of an irresistible mass, each unit of which had been prepared by physical training to do its part, and by practice, to hold its place in the great machine which was moving on Paris. The genius behind the training which made such marching possible, knew that war for infantry was largely a matter of legs and maintaining distances."

The same impression was produced in 1914, upon Richard Harding Davis, who describes the entry of a German army into Brussels:—

"It moved into the city as smoothly and compactly as an express train. There were no halts, no open places, no stragglers. It has been in active service three weeks, and so far there is not apparently a chin-strap or horseshoe missing. It came in with the smoke pouring from the cook-stoves on wheels, and in an hour had set up post-

office wagons from which mounted messengers galloped along the line of the column, distributing letters, and at which soldiers posted picture cards.

"The infantry came in files of five with two hundred men in each company, and the lancers in columns of four, with not a pennant missing. The men of the infantry sang 'Fatherland, My Fatherland', between each line of the song taking three steps. At times two thousand men were singing together in absolute rhythm, the beat of the melody giving way to a silence broken only by the stamp of iron-shod boots, and then again rising. When the singing ceased the bands played marches. During seven hours the army passed in such a solid column that not once might a taxi-cab or a trolley pass through the city. Like a river of steel it flowed, gray and ghostlike, and then, as dusk came, and as thousands of horses' hoofs and thousands of iron boots continued to tramp forward, they struck tiny sparks from the stones, but the horses and men who beat out the sparks were invisible.

"At seven this morning I was awakened by the tramp of men and bands playing jauntily. Whether they marched all night I do not know, but now for twenty-six hours the gray army has rumbled by with the mystery of a fog and the pertinacity of a steam roller."

The men above described, if not Brandenburg-ers, were descended from the kind of men who in the year 1813 picked their way through the mud of the German roads like geese in a barley-field, and went home at night discouraged or satisfied by the efforts of one day's campaign.

We shall see that discipline concerns itself in acquiring, among other habits, the habit of precisely executing the daily routine duties required on a campaign: the prompt obedience of orders that have for their object the feeding, clothing, and care of men: the practicing in times of peace the things which must be done in war, until they become second nature: the acquisition of collective confidence, courage, and strength, which make the actions of a real army suggest the movement of an express train and the pertinacity of a steam roller.

There are two episodes in American history, which occurred in the year 1814, one illustrates the folly of depending upon untrained citizens to resist invasion, the other shows how discipline imparts to men the tactical cohesion necessary to win.

The first is the account of a week's campaign in Maryland resulting in the battle of Bladensburg, the utter rout of an American army by a force numerically inferior, and the occupation of Washington by two hundred English soldiers.

The second episode is the story of how General Scott spent the spring of 1814 hammering into shape a body of recruits near Buffalo, and how they later made good at Chippewa, where they defeated a body of English regulars and Canadians superior in numbers.

In the Maryland campaign, General Ross with some forty-five hundred troops landed on August 18 at Benedict, near the mouth of the Patuxent River. His mission was to co-operate with a detachment of the English navy in destroying an American flotilla of small boats under Commodore Barney, which had been driven out of the Chesapeake, and had taken refuge in the Patuxent.

The City of Washington is situated on the Potomac River just west of its junction with the East Branch. The Patuxent flows south and into Chesapeake Bay. In their upper courses the Patuxent and the East Branch are parallel streams, some fifteen or twenty miles apart. In 1814, a road crossed the East Branch running due east from Washington to Upper Marlboro on the Patuxent. Another road ran north from Washington along the west bank of the East Branch, and crossing the river at Bladensburg, swung south to Upper Marlboro. On the East Branch below Bladensburg there were no bridges except at Washington.

Barney's flotilla lay at Pigs Point on the Patuxent, near Upper Marlboro. The British naval contingent moved up the Patuxent and the land forces moved on a road parallel to the west bank. When the British forces arrived in the vicinity of Upper Marlboro, the American flotilla was blown up by order of the Secretary of the Navy. This part of their mission having been arranged by an obliging enemy, and finding themselves only a few miles from Washington, with no serious opposition, the land forces abandoned their naval base on the river and proceeded in the direction of the Capital, taking the northern road through Bladensburg.

These troops had served with Wellington on the Spanish Peninsula and were well-seasoned veterans. The abdication and banishment of Napoleon to Elba had released them for service in America. They left Bordeaux on June 2. They landed much debilitated as the result of close confinement during a sea voyage of seventy days. The weather was exceedingly sultry and marching told severely upon them. Lieutenant Gleig, who was a subaltern, has left an interesting narrative of the events from the British point of view. He says:—"The second day, we marched six miles, during which a greater number of soldiers dropped out of the ranks and fell behind from fatigue, than I recollect seeing in any march

on the Peninsula." They were hampered by a lack of cavalry, which they attempted to improvise by seizing horses from the farmers. In this way they mounted some fifty soldiers who did duty as cavalry. The country over which the British troops marched was intersected with streams and woods. It was peculiarly adapted to defense and guerrilla warfare. In most places the road was so far from the river that the British infantry could not be supported by the naval detachment. Lieutenant Gleig served in the advance guard during the march from Benedict. He tells us that he expected to find the road obstructed by broken bridges and fallen trees, and that the advance would be harassed continually by hostile fire, and a repetition of the tactics from which the British suffered on their march from Concord and Lexington. He says that until they reached Upper Marlboro, the only hostile body met were two American riflemen, who represented themselves as friendly inhabitants hunting squirrels with bayonets. The lack of initiative on the part of American forces, and their failure to contest the advance, were powerful factors in determining the English to attempt a raid on Washington, after their mission against the American flotilla had been accomplished by the co-operation of the American Navy Department. The first and only serious opposition was encountered at Bladens-

burg, where the American forces were drawn up in three lines on the west bank of the East Branch. The bridge and its approaches were commanded by American artillery consisting of twenty-six cannon. The British had no guns, except three small pieces called "grasshoppers" which had no appreciable effect on the result. Lieutenant Gleig's description, somewhat abbreviated, is:—

"Our advance guard rushed the bridge. The fire of the American guns was very effective. We cleared out the American skirmishers on the bank. Their falling back on the first line threw it into confusion and before their infantry had fired a shot, the whole first line fled leaving the guns on the road. Our first line deployed, and covering the whole front advanced against the American second line. Our first line was too thin and was forced back to the bank of the stream and hung there. Our second brigade crossed, the Forty-fourth Regiment turned the American left, and the second line ran. The Fourth Regiment came up and defeated the rest. The fight lasted from one until five in the afternoon. About two-thirds of the British force was engaged. Their loss was five hundred men in killed and wounded. With the exception of a party of sailors from the gunboats under the command of Commodore Barney, no troops could behave worse than the Americans did. The skirmishers were driven in as soon

as attacked, the first line gave way without offering the slightest resistance, and the left of the main body was broken within a half-hour after it was seriously engaged. Of the sailors, however, it would be an injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision, which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands, nor was it till their leader was wounded and taken and they saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers that they quitted the field."

General Ross moved his troops to the vicinity of Washington where they encamped. The rout of the American army was complete. Ross attempted to open negotiations for the ransom of the city. It is said that the only official he could find was a janitor of one of the public buildings, who refused to negotiate, because the questions involved were beyond the jurisdiction of a janitor. The city was occupied by a few troops. The Capitol, White House, Treasury, Arsenal, barracks, rope-walk, a newspaper office, and several private residences were burned. The English justified the destruction of private property by the fact that some one fired a shot from the Sewall house at General Ross which killed his horse. On the night of August 25, Ross left the city, retrac-

ing his march without molestation to Benedict, which he reached on the 29th and re-embarked on September 6.

The American Government had early definite information, that the troops which left Bordeaux were intended for operation in the Chesapeake, but preparations were delayed. On July 4, the President's Cabinet held a meeting to consider the situation. A few days later a request was issued for ninety-three thousand militia to be organized at home and held in readiness. An immediate call was made for fifteen thousand. On July 2, the Tenth Military District, consisting of the State of Maryland, District of Columbia, and a part of Virginia, was created, and the command assigned to General Winder. As stated by the Secretary of War, "not on the ground of distinguished professional service, but because General Winder was a native of Maryland and a relative of the Governor." General Winder was a lawyer in Baltimore, who volunteered at the beginning of the war, was made a lieutenant-colonel, was captured, and about a year afterward exchanged, and made a general.

Two days after the British landed, General Winder's call for the militia was approved. On August 21, some troops were mustered and on the 22d were reviewed by the President. General Winder with a brigade of militia proceeded

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toward Marlboro over the lower road. Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State, with a companion reconnoitered the British advance, and reported the result to everybody including General Winder. As the two scouts disagreed as to the number of the enemy and their intentions, the result was not especially illuminating, but helped to throw the American militia and the inhabitants of Washington into a panic. On the evening of the 23d, Winder, fearing a night attack, retreated across the East Branch and into Washington.

The next day, hearing that the English were making for Bladensburg, he moved his forces to that point and joined some of the Maryland militia which had assembled there the previous day. The total American force at Bladensburg was in the vicinity of seven thousand. We were about eighty-six thousand "shy" of patriotic citizens springing to arms in response to the July request for ninety-three thousand militia. Commodore Barney and his sailors were left behind in Washington to blow up the bridges that crossed the East Branch in case of a British advance in that direction. Barney's command, whose action was the only redeeming feature on the American side that day, would have been eliminated from the fight, had not the President on his way to Bladensburg met Barney and asked him what he was doing. Barney replied that he and his command

had been left behind to do the work which "any damned corporal" could accomplish. The President asked him why he did not leave it to a corporal and come on to Bladensburg. Barney took this suggestion as an order, and trailing along behind Winder's army arrived in time to take part in the battle. Winder described his army "as suddenly assembled, without organization or discipline, or officers of the least knowledge of service." Our army, in the presence of the President and his Cabinet, was formed for battle in three lines. After formation and while waiting for the enemy, the Secretary of State took it upon himself to change the formation without consulting the commander. Some of the artillery was posted to command the crossing of the river and was especially effective against the first onrush of the British. The advance guard, without waiting for reconnoissance, attempted to rush the bridge with the usual English bull-headed determination. In this attempt they lost many men. After the battle began there was little team play or maneuvering on the part of the Americans. The various lines offered little support to one another and were successively attacked and turned. The mass of our army, struck by a panic, streamed west toward Georgetown and Rockville. They ceased to exist as an organization, and were scattered over twenty miles of territory to the north, west, and south of

Washington. The President and his Cabinet were scattered in the same rout. The difference in the morale of the troops engaged is illustrated by their losses. The American force of seven thousand men was annihilated, as an organization, after the loss of eight killed and eleven wounded.

The contrast between the behavior of our troops at Bladensburg, and at Chippewa is most refreshing. During the first half of the nineteenth century, General Scott looms large as the conspicuous professional soldier of America. He saw clearly that the problem of tactics was one of cohesion and team play, and that training for efficiency consists in developing and organizing the powers of each unit in a military establishment. He considered units to be, the individual man, the Company, the Regiment, the Brigade, and the Division. The work he emphasized was the training of each of these sub-divisions to its full capacity, as an entity, and as a unit in a larger team. The object of his work was to create a machine, standardized in all its parts, and capable of being maneuvered to deliver the maximum of fire and shock tactics against an enemy. The standardization of thinking and feeling was conspicuous in his scheme of instruction.

On March 24, 1814, General Scott joined General Brown's command at a camp some miles east of Buffalo. The force there assembled consisted

of seven regiments recently recruited in Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New York. They were organized into two brigades, commanded, respectively, by Scott and Ripley. The training of these troops was left to General Scott, the senior brigade commander. In his autobiography, he describes the work as follows:—

“Service of outposts, night patrols, guards, and sentinels was organized; a system of sanitary police including kitchen, etc., laid down; rules of civility, etiquette, and courtesy,—the indispensable outworks of subordination,—prescribed and enforced, and the tactical instruction of each arm commenced. Nothing but night, or a heavy fall of snow or rain, was allowed to interrupt these exercises on the ground to the extent, in tolerable weather, of ten hours a day for three months. As relaxation, both officers and men were thus brought to sigh for orders to beat up the enemy’s quarters, but the commander knew that such work could not be effectually done without the most laborious preparation.”

General Scott had no textbooks except one copy of French Tactics and one translation of the same.

“He began by forming the officers of all grades, indiscriminately, into squads and personally instructed them in the school of the soldier and company. They were then allowed to instruct

squads and companies of their own men, a whole field of them under the eyes of the general at once, who, in passing, took successively many companies in hand each for a time. So, too, on the formation of battalions, he instructed each an hour or two a day for many days, and afterwards carefully superintended their instruction by the respective field officers.

“The Brigadier-General’s labors were about the same in respect to lessons on subjects alluded to above, other than tactics, measures of safety for a camp near the enemy, police, etiquette, etc. The evolutions of the line, or the harmonious movement of many battalions in one or more lines with a reserve were next daily exhibited for the first time by an American army, and to the great delight of the troops themselves, who now began to perceive why they had been made to fag so long at the drill of the soldier, the company, and the battalion. Confidence, the dawn of victory, inspired the whole line.”

On July 3, Brown led his small force across the Niagara River and captured Fort Erie. On the 3d and 4th, Scott chased the retreating English, who met reinforcements at Chippewa Creek. Scott then retired behind Street’s Creek. On the 5th of July, Scott’s brigade enjoyed a dinner which had been scheduled as a celebration for the previous day. In the afternoon he paraded his troops

for grand evolution on the plain between Chipewewa and Street's Creeks. The American forces were clad in a uniform of cadet gray. This was accidental and resulted from the inability to obtain the regulation blue when they were mustered. On account of this uniform, Riall, the British commander, thought he was opposed by a body of Buffalo militia, and about the time Scott was crossing Street's Creek, he deployed his forces for an attack. As the head of Scott's column crossed the creek, he was advised by General Brown of the situation and the prospect of a fight. As Riall saw the American column, after crossing the bridge, deploy under fire, he is said to have exclaimed in surprise, "Damn it, those fellows are regulars and not militia." General Scott formed his command with an interval in the center. As he expresses it:—

"The battalions of Leavenworth and McNeil, thus formed, pointed to an obtuse angle in the center of the plain, with a wide interval between them, that made up for a deficiency in numbers. To fire, each party had halted more than once, at which the Americans had the more deadly aim. At an approximation to within sixty or seventy paces, the final charge (mutual) was commenced. The wings of the enemy, being outflanked and to some extent doubled upon, were mouldered away like a rope of sand."

Riall commanded in this battle some fifteen hundred regulars and six hundred militia. Scott's force numbered thirteen hundred. The English lost five hundred and fifteen and the Americans two hundred and ninety-seven. General Scott's comment was, that by the battle of Chippewa the pulse of America recovered a healthy beat.

In honor and in commemoration of this victory, the tarbucket hat and the gray cloth worn by our soldiers were adopted as the uniform of the cadets of the United States Military Academy.

In the War of 1812 the regular army had to be created, and was unable to furnish a standard of skill or discipline to the militia. The soldiers who fought at Lundy Lane and Chippewa were drilled by General Scott during the war. He was compelled to teach the officers of his regiments the elements of squad drill before he led them against the enemy.

During the thirty years which intervened between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, we had a corps of officers in the regular establishment, trained in that army, most of whom enjoyed the additional advantage of being graduated from the Military Academy at West Point.

In the Mexican War, under skilled officers, a force of less than five thousand volunteers, supported by a few regular troops, overthrew the Mexican army of four times its number. In this

war the regular establishment from its officers furnished able commanders and in every field set an example of skill, fortitude, and courage. These results were attributed by General Scott to the influence of military education. He said to the Senate of the United States:—

“I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas in less than two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish.”

It was the spirit of West Point which was responsible for the victories of Cerro Gordo, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, and it will be the same spirit and the same standards of discipline and training infused into the militia by contact with the regular army that can and must make the Guard a military asset of national value.

II

DEFINITION OF DISCIPLINE

THE meaning of the word discipline will vary with our understanding of what constitutes a soldier and how he is made. If soldier means for us simply a man with a gun, then the process of making a soldier is a simple matter. If we conceive of the finished soldier as one having a confirmed habit of obedience, and disregard all the mental life that lies back of this habitual response, our idea of discipline will still be comparatively limited. The soldier will be one who has the habit of subconscious obedience, and discipline will be the process leading to that condition. This is the historical conception of discipline which underlies our Drill Regulations. Modern learning, however, will not let us rest satisfied with so simple a definition. There is more to a soldier than an habitual type of response to a given signal. There is a soldierly way of thinking, feeling, and willing, as well as of acting. General Schaff's book:—"The Spirit of Old West Point"—shows that the author's idea of

a soldier is not limited to the narrow vision of a man with a gun. He sees the beginning and the end of military training, and its effect upon the nation. The cadets sweep by in perfect alignments, the embodiment of physical vigor; the man and the gun are there, but the meaning is more. The martial spectacle not only pleases the author, but its sights and sounds call from hidden depths associations, which awaken deeper and more reverent sentiments of love and veneration for the Academy.

To him the cadet picture suggests a list of heroes, who have been giants in his country's cause and honor. He thinks of courage, service, and the fellowship of officers, who, drawing inspiration from the four short years of cadet life, developed into leaders. He remembers those who in loyalty and devotion gave themselves freely to the cause they served. He sees a vision of the purpose of the Academy, the great influence of its atmosphere turning the sunny side of youth to courage and honor with the injunction—be steadfast. In the author's mind, all these things blend in the idea of a soldier.

The history of a life of action is the story of practical problems met and solved. The capacity to make correct solutions depends in part upon organized experience. All industrial training seeks to increase power by imparting knowledge of the

elements handled and by practical experience in handling these elements. I call the result of this combination of knowledge and practice organized experience. An important and often preponderating element entering into the correct solution of a problem is the personality of the actor. A person with self-control, of a courageous spirit, and with a capacity for considering problems from an impersonal and detached point of view has the making of a valuable man, when he has mastered a subject and acquired organized experience in handling its details. It is the purpose of West Point to develop this sort of power.

The Military Academy expects her sons to become soldiers, and attempts an education which imparts knowledge of the art of war, and as far as possible offers practical opportunities for organizing this knowledge and making it experience. This is apparent to a casual visitor. As a part of the curriculum, however, there is an unseen process of character-building. It is sometimes called the "Spirit of Old West Point working in the cadets." Whatever called, it is the educating of the students in conformity to certain standards.

The correct performance of a military duty is characterized by self-control, a determined spirit, and a detached point of view which place the success of a cause above personal considerations. West Point attempts this kind of education.

Power of this sort is essential for success in any active calling. Vocations other than the military stand in equal need of it, but its absence is not so apparent, because failure in business or professional life is not so far reaching as in war.

In most colleges the curriculum stores memory with interesting and helpful nuggets of information, and the students follow trails that lead to an understanding of various subjects, but the race usually stops short of the goal of a complete knowledge of any one subject. The mental pabulum is a hash—a superficial seasoning of everything and depth in nothing. West Point is not so discursive in its effort for general culture as most colleges. In one subject it tries to reach the bed-rock of knowledge. The cadets are taught discipline. It stays with them through every hour of every day for four years. Every period is full of its problems. The year is three hundred and sixty-five days of subordination. They learn the necessity of discipline, what it is, why and how it is taught, and are grounded in the universal faith of soldiers, that without it military success is impossible.

The A B C's of self-control are taught in physical exercises, the purpose of which is to make the body an efficient machine and subordinate. By repetition the lower nerve centers and the muscles are educated until correct performances become

habits.

The subordination of the will is largely a matter of imitation and pressure. First comes submission to orders in the daily requirements of academic life, and later subordination to standards for the purposes of a larger life. The pleb finds patterns in the upper classmen. He is told to imitate their behavior. If he refuses, the consequences are sufficiently serious to modify his attitude. The weight of public opinion is always upon the side of conformity. He submits and goes through the mill of doing things in a soldierly way, until his physical make-up is a bunch of correct habits which carry him through his daily routine with the minimum of demerits. So far he learns to do what he is told, to look like a soldier and act like one in the little world at West Point. Physical training is not elective. In every form of team contest the cadet learns something practical of loyalty and service to his group. This is not peculiar to West Point. There is at the Academy, however, a great historical background, and its daily life is in a setting charged with suggestions of men whose supreme purpose in life was to render service. The spirit of such men lives in the memory of their work. Unconsciously the suggestion of loyalty and service in noble lives has a powerful formative influence upon plastic youth. There is in the atmosphere a reverence

for soldierly greatness. Military history, as taught, is full of examples of men who failed, because they lacked subordination, courage, or capacity to throw themselves into a cause with the abandon that disregards personal consequences. Gradually it dawns upon cadets that their power of efficient self-expression as officers depends upon a right kind of thinking and feeling about themselves which furnishes the imperative push behind action. This unseen source of strength becomes interesting and absorbing. The personalities of great men are studied for correct emotional tones. As the plebs keep step with the older cadets, so upper classmen begin to keep step with great captains. Imperceptibly ideals grow and take possession of the mind. In a composite picture of these ideals, there is always the image of physical and mental control, and the courageous spirit fighting for what it believes right to the limit of endurance—Honor, Country, and Duty are facts luminously clear. The cadets learn to know and value the spirit of service and subordinate themselves to its demands. In many ways the academic life puts cadets in the way of recognizing and copying greatness. The Academy does what Phillips Brooks once recommended in a talk, the subject of which was Washington: "Cultivate reverence for Greatness. Teach it to your children. Cultivate perception of it. The double

blessing of pattern and power."

A man's whole range of mental life is involved in being a soldier and no part can act alone. Discipline must be defined, in terms of the whole man, as the acquisition and organization of soldierly thoughts, feelings, and methods of conduct.

The elements in the process will be most clear to us if we consider such a recognized course of military training as that given at the United States Military Academy. There are three steps in the process as there illustrated.

First—a standard is set before the cadets. There is gradually developed in them, according to their power of absorption, an idea of what the well-rounded military character should be—not only how he should look and carry himself physically, but how he should think, feel, and act under all situations. This imparting of knowledge of standards is primarily an intellectual process.

Second—this step has to do with the valuation of standards. The task is to develop the self-respect of the cadet, in such a way that he will acquire a master sentiment to conform and mould his life to the accepted standards. The military virtues and acts which make for efficiency in war must appeal to him as supreme models of perfection which dominate and fill him with the hope and faith of a personal growth. As the intellect is involved in acquiring ideas of the standards so

the feelings are involved in this valuation of standards.

Third—this step involves the effort, with its strivings, its victories, and defeats, to make habitual the acts which the standards demand and which the feelings impel.

During his four years the cadet is given the most favorable environment possible—the environment in which the standards would naturally live; and is encouraged to think, feel, and act as a soldier should. His mental and physical life is so organized that the desire to attain the military ideal gains the force of a controlling passion and dominates conduct. I do not think this process attains full development in four short years. The cadets are probably still cubs at graduation, but they are lion cubs. As officers the growth should continue. Each has been put in the way of attaining, according to his light, an intellectual grasp on some image of perfection; and, if his feelings rise to the plane of making the attainment of that ideal a master sentiment, and if, by repeated conflicts and victories over other impulses, this master sentiment establishes an habitual dominion over other motives, a time comes when conflict ceases and the master sentiment operates automatically, as the sole controller and regulator of conduct. I analyze this process under three heads—

1. Knowledge of the standards.

2. Interest in the standards, and the growth of a desire to make them personal ideals.

3. Practice, or the struggle through which the standards are assimilated and made one's own.

These various phases of the process do not necessarily follow in orderly succession. In the prevailing order of military instruction the natural order is worked backwards. Education begins by furnishing certain models for imitation and imposing these standards upon the recruit. Kipling has described this method of hammering:—

“The young recruit is 'aughty—'e draf's from
Gawd knows where;
They bid him show 'is stockin's an' lay 'is mat-
tress square;
'E calls it bloomin' nonsense—'e doesn't know no
more—
An' then up comes 'is Company an' kicks 'im round
the floor;

“The young recruit is 'ammered—'e takes it very
'ard;
'E hangs 'is 'ead an' mutters—'e sulks about the
yard;
'E talks o' cruel tyrants which 'e'll swing for by
an' bye,
An' the others 'ears an' mocks 'im, an' the boy
goes off to cry.

"The young recruit is silly—'e thinks o' suicide;
'E's lost 'is gutter-devil; 'e 'asn't got 'is pride;
But day by day they kick 'im which 'elps 'im on a
bit,

Till 'e finds 'isself one mornin' with a full and
proper kit.

"The young recruit is 'appy—'e throws a chest to
suit;

You see 'im grow mustaches; you 'ear 'im slap 'is
boot;

'E learns to drop the Bloodies from every word he
slings,

An' 'e shows a 'ealthy brisket when 'e strips for
bars an' rings."

In the end, the recruit gets the right ideas and feelings about a soldier; but the process is wasteful. Why not give him some conception of what his training means in the first place? If he knows what he is about, he may desire the "'ealthy brisket;" look forward to it, and work more heartily for it on that account.

Here we do not mean to go at the method of discipline backwards. It is the object of this School to enlarge your conceptions of a soldier, to fill you with notions of service and duty, which will fit in with and become a part of your original ideas. It is the purpose to surround you with

living thoughts to be absorbed and made your own, so that in the hereafter, when called to exercise the vocation of an officer, your outlook will see something more in a soldier than a man with a gun.

Such a combination will appeal to you as a masquerading caricature, unless behind it there is the spirit of obedience, loyalty, and devotion, and the training which makes these efficient.

III

KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS

WE spoke of the first phase in the organization of military character as knowledge of standards. It is difficult for a thinking being to play a part without having some notion about how he should think and feel to sustain the character he assumes. All soldiers have some idea of the type they think they represent and make the type a standard up to which they play. Some years ago I had an interesting talk with an old soldier who had served in the Rebellion, and who had been a high ranking officer in the militia for many years before the war. Speaking of his earlier experiences he said, "The Boston companies counted it a fine military stunt to march up State Street in a private uniform behind a brass band, with one hundred muskets." When Kossuth visited Boston we had a parade in his honor. The streets were filled with brass bands, tall bearskin hats, and white cross belts. No two companies dressed alike. Kossuth made a speech in which he said he had "never seen anything like it in

Europe." My friend told me that he thought all this was fine military business while he was taking part in it, but later he learned there was nothing of value in it except good fellowship, and to make efficient soldiers for the work of war it is necessary to keep in step with a different type.

My personal experience in the militia confirms this view. In 1898 patriotism was at a white heat among the Massachusetts militia. Very few were gun-shy. They enlisted to fight and were anxious to get on to the firing-line. The spirit was fine. The regiments were as aggressive to butt into war as a flock of goats, and, as quick military assets, were about as valuable.

For years we had performed our annual tour of duty at Framingham. By practice we had acquired the habit of obeying, when in ranks, the orders laid down in the Drill Book for close-order movements. Out of ranks, not much attention was paid to orders. There was little need for any order, except an occasional admonition not to drink too much. The observance of such an order was, however, optional, because a man's stomach was considered his own property, and any attempt to control eating or drinking was, by common consent, an invasion of personal rights. The Quartermaster and Commissary Departments were ornamental. Hired men installed and broke camp, hired caterers prepared and served food. We

never did any marching, and transportation was unnecessary, as express companies delivered baggage at the tent door. We acquired guard-mounting and dress-parade habits, and some knowledge of drill. Public opinion condemned drill on hot days, but encouraged ball-playing. Weather permitting, we had about two hours on and twenty-two off, sometimes more than twenty-two off. The social instinct was satisfied, and that was considered sufficient. The outfit could not have pulled out and marched to Springfield. Some daring spirits might have reached there, supported by charity, but the rest of the column would have trailed out between Worcester and Framingham, like geese in the barley, and have gone home by train or trolley when they got hungry.

I remember some one proposed a practice march, but the wise State authorities frowned upon it, because its hardship would seriously interfere with recruiting. The camp was a jolly picnic, and we were not ashamed to go to it in uniform, because we knew no better.

The awakening came in 1898 when the United States took us in hand and attempted in a few days to build upon and expand regulations suitable for the conduct of a small army during a period of thirty-five years of peace. The system failed and went to pieces. The mere mass of untrained, disorganized, undisciplined, and badly officered men

who were assembled in the various Southern camps created panic and disorganization. We were far from home, without money, and without practice in doing the things necessary to care for ourselves under service conditions. The result was inevitable—sickness and demoralization.

The lessons of the Spanish War sank into the hearts of the militia. We appreciated the extravagance of sending untrained officers to command a willing bunch, anxious, but ignorant of how to fit themselves for war. After the war we were at Framingham again for a few years, until the Dick Bill passed when some wag hung on the musterfield gate the legend, "To Hell with Framingham and its traditions." No one needed a Daniel to interpret the writing on the wall. We all knew that hereafter a tour of duty must mean practice in the things useful in war, and that the rest was of no account. Intelligent officers and men began to ask themselves, "What is the best thing we can do, in the limited time at our disposal, to fit ourselves for field service?"

We are all familiar with the child who, beginning to understand objects in life, calls a horse a mooley cow. To his infantile mind cats, dogs, horses, cows and soldiers are nothing but the same kind of things moving about in much the same way. Later on, as experience enlarges, differentiations are made which put dogs in the dog class

and cows in the cow class. Unfortunately, only a few people have had experiences which force them to differentiate between a soldier and any man in uniform carrying a gun.

It is a common error to suppose that it is an easy matter to dress a million men in uniforms, give them rifles, and thereby create an army. American military history is usually written in this vein. It is the point of view of Sam Slick's father, who announced that "Bunker Hill was generally allowed to be the most splendid battle that ever was fought, and Doctor Warren the first soldier of his age, though he never fought afore."

When I define a soldier, I think of him in terms of his training. I see in the finished product the various processes through which the raw material goes in the making.

The rookie is put through a course of training to give him command of his muscles, develop strength, and ability to march naturally and freely under the burdens that he must carry in a campaign. Besides learning to use his own body, he must acquire skill in using his weapon; if a rifle, he must learn how to care for and use it, both as a shooting and stabbing weapon.

Colonel Dodge, in his life of Hannibal, gives us a picture of a Roman trained in this way:—

"They did not teach the young citizen the theory of war, but gave him a practical drilling

in what he would have to do when at seventeen years of age he would be drafted into the ranks. They had no schools or teachers of science; they considered such learning unnecessary—certainly less excellent than the habit of obedience, coupled with strength and the expert use of arms. Thus they laid the foundation of exemplary discipline and a practical knowledge of what war was among the rank and file. The higher military education was left to the richer and more noble families to give by private instruction to their sons. But these sons, in common with all the rest, must report at given times on the field of Mars for drill. No exceptions were made. Here, under experienced drill-masters and headed by old soldiers, they were practiced in the soldier's setting-up, marching in correct time and style, the run, climbing heights and walls, singly and in squads, with and without arms and baggage, jumping ditches and obstacles, vaulting and swimming. They were taught the use of all the weapons they would be called on to handle, for which purpose heavy posts were set up at which the youths shot with bows, cast darts and spears, and on which they made sham attacks with the sword; and they were instructed how to use their shields so as to protect the body in every position. In these exercises all weapons were much heavier, Polybius says twice the weight of the actual ones, to inure the youth

to his work. In addition to the above, heavy loads were carried, intrenchments dug, camps fortified, and such works attacked and defended.

"Once in the service, the soldier had yet harder work to do. He was steadily drilling in the field, in camp, and in garrison. Constant occupation was believed to be the best means of keeping up the soldier's morale—a truism which is not always acted on to-day. Hence practice marches with full equipment and baggage, maneuvers, fortifications so far as it was essential for the camp, were common, and the men were not infrequently put on public works.

"The burden carried by the Roman soldier is scarcely credible, though from youth up he was trained to bearing heavy loads at drill. The foot soldier carried all through the campaign on the right shoulder two or three posts or palisades for the stockade of the nightly camp; these were quite long and two or three inches thick. Slung to the end of these was his bag of corn, calculated to last him at least two weeks, his shield, lance, and as many as seven darts he carried on his right arm. The helmet, if not worn, hung on his breast by a strap. At times he must also carry axe, saw, spade, scythe, a rope, a basket, and a pot to cook his rations in. His cloak was rolled up and slung on his back. About extra clothing, or sandals, we do not hear. These with the armor, made up a

weight which had to be borne under the sun, dust, and sand of Italy and Africa, through the heavy mud of spring and fall and through the everlasting snows of the mountains. Including his clothing, the Roman soldier, with the load above given, must have carried something over eighty-five pounds, much more than half his own average weight."

As Gibbon says, "In the midst of peace, the Roman troops familiarized themselves with the practices of war." And he quotes a remark of an ancient historian who had fought against them. "The effusion of blood was the only circumstance which distinguished a field of battle from a field of exercise." We cannot overestimate the importance of the qualities for which the Romans worked. Endurance and skill at arms are as important to-day as they were in ancient times. They are, however, the background of the soldier's life. The early Roman battles were won by individual prowess in hand-to-hand encounters. Battles are won to-day by the tactical cohesion of units, each numbering hundreds of men. The strength and prowess of individuals tell and always will, but they count as strong raw material out of which a higher unit is moulded. Success on the modern battlefield depends upon the efficiency of these higher units in team play. To attain this, the training of a soldier involves more than the train-

ing of single men. We must consider the single man and also train him in connection with the organization of which he is a part.

There are three essential qualities which make a soldier an effective part of a military organization: prompt obedience; exact obedience; and subordination.

Promptness and exactness are the Siamese Twins of military virtues. We naturally think of them together. They are the two qualities which are important in assuring correct responses in battle. In the midst of a chaos of noise and the confusion of action under fire, it is only the men in whom such qualities have become ingrained who can be depended upon to respond to orders. If the modern methods of warfare continue and we add bombardment from aeroplanes to death by other means, soldiers will need these qualities in more stringent forms than ever.

The qualities of promptness and exactness can be trained in one of two ways; and will differ accordingly. We can follow the lead of the old Prussian model or that of West Point. What I call the old Prussian model was described by Marshal Saxe when he declared that soldiers should be machines animated only by the voice of their commander. His statement shows what sort of obedience he expected. Men should react with the invariability, that is, the promptness and ex-

actness, of machines. To this end, they were made to go through endless drills until they responded without thinking to regular orders. There is a story which illustrates the result of such training. When an old soldier was going to work with his dinner pail, a practical joker called, "Attention!" Immediately the old soldier jumped to the position of a soldier. His dinner pail fell, mutton and potatoes rolled in the gutter forgotten.

There is one drawback to this system. When men are trained into machines, they become subject to the limitations of machines. If the practical joker had assumed the voice of an old commander and ordered, "Over the nearest fence!" it is questionable whether the old soldier would have responded in such a way as to have endangered his luncheon.

The West Point method tries to make good where the old Prussian system runs the risk of failure. The cadets are put through a novel type of efficiency calisthenics. Major Koehler in his drills, gives any descriptive order that comes into his head. He may say, "Right hand on hip!" "Left hand on nose!" or anything else. The cadets have to keep awake. In time they get so they can answer the most unexpected order promptly and exactly. They attain the kind of promptness and exactness that we need. They become more dependable than machines, because they can be

counted upon to respond to the unexpected and yet with the sureness of a machine.

The West Point idea of subordination is not the unintelligent response of a machine, but the loyal support of an active mind, which grasps the purpose of a commander and strives to advance it with force and energy.

The point I wish to emphasize in this connection is, the great importance of retaining initiative. Paradoxically, the other point I wish to emphasize is, the importance of losing initiative to a certain extent—the importance of subordination.

In a recent publication a Russian officer contrasts soldiers with it and without it. He says:—

“While, in attacking even weakly defended positions, German generals have had to send their soldiers forward in dense masses, and by this means artificially endow them with courage and tenacity, our Russian soldiers, though often greatly outnumbered, go forward on their own initiative to certain death because they understand the necessity of self-sacrifice, and of their own wills strain towards it.”

There is in this story something more than obedience. The picture of self-sacrifice involves the idea of a standard, which the Russian soldier holds as an ideal, and to which he subordinates everything, even life. We see here a higher form of subordination than mere obedience. The sol-

dier obeys, not only because he has acquired the habit of doing what he is told, but also because he sees the necessity of obedience in the particular instance, and is willing to expend himself in a fearless effort.

Subordination includes obedience to orders, the living up to ideals, and the surrender of personal desires for the good of the group. We see examples of this last phase within families. You all know the family conclave over the purchase of a piano or a Ford. Expenses are cut off here and shaved down there. The smallest boy does not resent the sacrifice of swimming lessons for the sake of the family purpose. The old man may give up smoking. This is real subordination. You can see the same thing reproduced in a company where there exists the group spirit. The commissary is poor. The company gets together, plants a garden, and raises vegetables. The newest recruit does not grumble at his share of weeding. The purpose of the group is his purpose. One may ask how he comes to feel this way. The answer is that men are endowed with as much unselfishness as selfishness. Introduce a recruit into a company where all are working together in the spirit of a common interest and he will get into that spirit.

Subordination in all its phases is the conception which the officer must get across to his men. The

question is, "How?" When thought is conveyed by language, it is the art of the teacher to clothe ideas in words that impinge with a stinging sensation, the effect of which remains and helps lodge the idea as a part of one's permanent possession.

I will illustrate this by an experience in which part of the school participated. We have an understanding with the authorities at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul that we shall be brought into contact, during our services there, with men of personality. This is done in the hope that some idea may be dropped and find lodgment which will enrich your idea of a soldier. At one service, the clergyman took as his text, "And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain." He drew the picture of a Jewish population living under Roman dominion, and subject to be commandeered with their animals and carts for a mile of duty. The mile had to be done. The only liberty was a choice of the spirit in which it should be traveled. The parallel is in our daily life. We must all do our mile or its equivalent. Shall we play our part in a grouch or in the spirit of the two-mile man?

The next day I had an opportunity of seeing the same idea driven home by repetition. I attended a dinner given by the Eighth Regiment officers to a retiring comrade. He was the type of a two-mile man. I was called upon to make the first

speech. I plagiarized the sermon, and made of it a personal application to the principal guest. The story is apt, concise, and has a sting of sufficient intensity to force itself home. It got into the minds and on to the tongues of every one who followed me. As the meeting grew in good fellowship, it seemed altogether desirable and worthy to be a two-miler, and everybody was cheering for the two-mile man and promising to be another.

Even if an idea is attractive, it usually needs repetition to give it a permanent lodgment to grow and become a part of the standard. You all know the change of feeling that comes with the next morning. The one mile is before us as hateful as ever, and the spirit of the two-miler seems less reasonable in the cold dawn of getting to work. New ideas are not usually grafted by one assertion. They grow into and become part of us only after many repetitions. It takes time and repetition for them to catch on for keeps, and to become incorporated as permanent possessions and tendencies to action. Repetition strengthens and renews growth, until the idea, excluding all rivals, possesses the mind as a controlling and dominating standard. There are cases, but they are rare, where intensity of experience does the work usually performed by repeated affirmation.

Here and there in books on training, we find references to the principle that an idea once re-

ceived into the mind and impressed with intensity must go somewhere, and do work—perhaps not to-day, or yet to-morrow. The idea of being a two-miler, once assimilated, may drop below the level of consciousness and seemingly be forgotten. Yet some day, when needed, it may walk into consciousness with all the assurance of a “Johnny on the Spot,” who means to take charge and run things. When Grant was peddling wood at the back doors of the houses of St. Louis, there was working within him the spirit of the two-miler waiting for Vicksburg and Appomattox.

In trying to understand the ways of the brain, it is helpful to study the behavior of abnormal persons. The difference between sanity and insanity is often the difference of functioning a little more or a little less. We often find, in the institutions, men who imagine themselves the Mikado of Japan, the Emperor of Germany, or some other noted person. As soon as such an idea gets possession of their minds, they begin to assume the carriage, gait, general conduct, and behavior which they believe appropriate to the person they think they are. Such bodily actions become part and parcel of their daily lives. Their actions are the reflexes of the idea which dominates the mind. They are often ridiculous. The man at Danvers, who thought he was a “Mother in Israel,” showed his faith by consuming bottles of Lydia Pinkham’s

Vegetable Compound. In his ignorance, he was doing his best to act the part. The interesting fact to be deduced from such experiences is, that when the mind is dominated by the idea that a person is a certain character, his conduct will automatically begin to display characteristics appropriate to the kind of man the subject thinks he is.

While reading the autobiography of Carl Schurz, I came across an example of how an idea develops a standard and influences the formation of character. As a boy, Schurz lived with his grandfather, who was a sort of caretaker and gardener in a German castle. Speaking of his youth he says,—“I saw for the first time, in a penny magazine, the picture of George Washington, whom my grandfather called the noblest man in all history, because he had commanded large armies in the war for the liberation of his people, and, instead of making himself a king, had voluntarily divested himself of his power and returned to the plough as a simple farmer; by his example, my grandfather explained to me what it was to be a true patriot.” Years after, this German lad, grown to manhood, stood in the uniform of a Federal officer in the battle where the wave of secession broke, at Gettysburg.

When you command men, act on this principle. Make them believe they are soldiers, and give them concrete examples of the conduct of a soldier.

The idea of being a soldier will work itself out into action, imitating models which men make their ideals.

For militia officers it is especially essential to act on this principle. To the men, they are the models. They suggest, by examples, actions, feelings, and modes of viewing conduct, what a soldier should be. In the militia it is not as it is at West Point. There the whole environment is manipulated to produce the effect by indirect suggestion. The cadets imitate the copy set in the actions, temper, and emotions of the life around them, until, encased in the iron bands of habit, they lay a concrete foundation of character. By this method West Point has furnished the leaven that works for solidarity and efficiency in our little army.

In the militia we have no such environment. Like incubator chickens, we are introduced into military life with few leaders qualified to furnish us with enthusiasm, and serve as models. We have not the homogeneity necessary to develop the common opinions and sentiments which make collective acting efficient. Our officers and men have not a common purpose, the same ideas of the service, or knowledge of their place in it, or the appropriate sentiments which each should feel as members of the mass. Under such circumstances greater responsibility lies with the trained offi-

cers. They must create the environment which works by suggestion. Somehow they must get across to their men the idea of being a soldier and the associated ideas of what a soldier should be, so that they will work out, not only in conduct, but also in emotional states, very much as the delusion that one is Alexander or Napoleon works itself out in the emotional states and behavior of an insane person.

The important feature is the development of an imperative idea of what a soldier should be. This involves instilling a correct notion of what a real soldier is, and also associating that idea with a punch which translates it into action. We put "pep" into ideas by appealing to reason, interest, or by linking them up with the play of instincts or with some of the desires which are inherent in the way the human mind is constituted. What we seek to obtain is the irresistible impulse urging the actor to jump into the game of soldiering and play his part hard and according to the rules.

IV

INTEREST

THE second phase in our process of character-building is the development of such an interest in military standards that they become valued as something to be striven for and attained as personal possessions. In this respect the School has an advantage over a place where military training is compulsory. You are here to put forth physical and mental effort because you enjoy the work and love the game.

In the time of Frederick the Great, owing to the short range of firearms, the shock of battle was quickly over. His success depended upon the drill and mobility of his army, which enabled him to launch an oblique attack against a flank of his opponent and to press the attack home with rapidity before his opponent could change front. The efficiency of Frederick's army depended entirely upon the driving force of his drill-sergeants and their ability to persuade men to sustain the shock of battle for the short time necessary to insure success. The whole performance took place un-

der the eye and personal direction of the King. The less his officers and soldiers thought or reasoned, the better instruments they were for his purpose. With him, discipline was induced by a rigorous system of punishment. In instilling the habits necessary for success he relied almost entirely upon the potency of the big stick. It was often said that the Prussian soldier of his day was more afraid of the cane of the drill-sergeant than he was of the enemy's bullets. The old Prussian system is an example of driving men by a system of punishment. Their interest was not stimulated or even considered.

Some years ago, while commanding the Eighth Massachusetts Infantry, I took the officers and non-commissioned officers to West Point to take part in one of their practice marches and maneuvers. I was surprised to hear the Commandant of Cadets speak of our trip as an inspiration to the West Point Cadets. To distinguish us from the cadets during the maneuvers we acquired the name of "Boston soldiers." The Commandant afterwards explained his remarks to me by saying that the cadets did their work because they had to, but the Boston soldiers put physical and mental effort into the maneuvers for love of the game and because they enjoyed it. Their interest explained their efforts. I do not use the word interest, however, as synonymous with entertainment. After

attending a vaudeville show you may say you have been interested in the comedians or a performance of trained monkeys. You mean you were amused. You have no desire to reproduce their antics in your own experience. The performance has not been interesting in the sense that it makes you wish to be a comedian or a trained monkey.

The kind of interest which we seek to awaken in this School is the kind which the patent medicine man tries to arouse by his advertisements among would-be purchasers. The advertising appeal is directed to the needs of the purchaser, and is an attempt to make the victim accept the nostrum as something which will satisfy a long-felt want. In the same way we present a military standard for your acceptance. We desire to make you feel that we are offering something of value in your business of living which you ought to adopt and use. Our proposition is to awaken your interest in a type because it satisfies your needs and wants. It is no nostrum. It has stood the test of time, and has met the approval of every great captain. Its part in military training is an inheritance of the ages. It comes to you with the approval of all fighting men since history began. Military life finds its satisfaction either in the ends served, means adopted, or something associated with these ends or means. I heard General Wood describe a visit to Switzerland during a

maneuver period. He met citizens who extolled their military system as offering a defense against foreign aggression and as training youths in habits which were assets in industrial life. Some of the youths with whom he talked seemed to find their interest associated with the attitude of the Swiss lasses toward military shirks. A number of young soldiers told him that a lad could not get near a girl unless he did full military duty. We wish you to be interested in military character as something useful to you in your business as future officers, and to understand that you cannot carry on the business of being an officer without this as the principal asset.

No nostrum can satisfy which does not allow for self-expression. Interest centers in the idea of practical application. We may define it as a VISION OF AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SELF-EXPRESSION IN WAYS WHICH MEET OUR APPROVAL OR THE APPROVAL OF OTHERS IN WHOM WE HAVE CONFIDENCE.

Interest is limited to our sphere of self-expression. Some years ago an acquaintance, who was a notorious politician, told me that when a youth he had committed to memory the Synoptic Gospels, to please his mother. A little while ago I mentioned this fact to a philosopher, and also the fact that my friend's knowledge of the Bible did not seem to produce any practical results in his

own life. The philosopher remarked that my political friend probably found his reward in gratifying his mother, and that his interest in the Bible stopped there, because he saw no opportunity to use its great teachings in his own business.

Interest can be developed by increasing the power of attention. There are laws of attention, the observance of which serves our purpose in creating and sustaining interest. In a general way the more a man knows about a subject, the greater is his interest in, and power of sustained attention in reference to, that subject. A short time ago I passed an evening with a village blacksmith before an open fire. While we sat there he took up a rough iron poker and talked most entertainingly about the construction of its handle. I knew nothing about poker handles and could not have concentrated my attention upon one for more than a few seconds. The blacksmith's mind, however, was stored with many ideas and images connected with the details of poker handles. He was using this knowledge in his daily work. Everything he said was full of meaning in terms of past experience. He talked to me for over an hour about poker handles. This man had a real interest in the subject. Poker handles meant much to him because he made them. He had use for every idea in reference to them and the subject was alive with interest connected with his own business. His

memory was stored with a mass of ideas associated in his past experience with iron-working. It was because of this very mass of past experience that all sorts of images and ideas flowed into the focus of his consciousness as he talked. These associated ideas continually brought back his attention to the subject of his discussion.

In the same way you will find that the more you know about military affairs, and the more experience you have organized and stored in your memory, the easier it will be for you to keep your attention upon any military subject, turn it over in your mind, using and applying your ideas to fit it into and understand it in terms of your past experience.

As a form of intellectual activity the mere mental gymnastics of thinking in terms of past experience is interesting. Every idea attended to develops energy and has a tendency to do work. Last year I illustrated this by showing how the image of a bodily movement has a tendency to reproduce the act of which the idea is an image. I told the class that I was going to ask one of the officers downstairs to come into the classroom, that I would ask him to extend his right arm and right forefinger and, without moving either, explain to the class the sensation of crooking his finger as in the trigger-pull. I told the class that I would stand before the officer, crook my finger before

his eyes, illustrating the movement which I wished him to describe; that I would not watch his hand, but would concentrate my attention upon attempting to produce in his mind an image of the movement which I wished him to describe. I asked the class to watch the officer's fore-finger, expecting that, although he had been told and had agreed to keep that finger stiff, the mere fact that he held, in the focus of his consciousness, the idea of its movements, would be sufficient to cause him to crook the finger. We got an officer to come from downstairs. He stood with his back toward the class, agreed to do what he was told, and then extended his arm and finger as directed. I stood in front of him, crooked my own finger, and talked to him fluently as to what I wished him to think of and describe. Before he had opened his mouth to say anything he had crooked his finger two or three times, and the experiment was broken up by the class indulging in peals of laughter.

An idea attended to and holding the focus of consciousness always does some work. When the blacksmith was talking to me about a poker handle, I could not keep my attention on a poker handle for more than a few seconds, without the help of his ideas. When I think of poker handles I am conscious that I have an internal image of a poker handle. It has no meaning, however, it is just a poker handle, and when I have grasped that,

there is nothing more in it for me, and the image fades away, and its place is taken by some other image or idea in the ordinary flow of thought. I cannot keep my attention on poker handles. It is too stupid, and there is nothing in it to continue my interest. The blacksmith, however, had a lot of associated ideas connected with poker handles, and the image before him kept calling up in his mind various ideas. His past experience was stored with all sorts of ideas connected with poker handles, and although his attention fluctuated from the image of the poker handle before him, still every thought which flowed into his mind had some connection with pokers. The poker was the central thought about which these ideas ranged for over an hour. In the same way you cannot keep your attention and interest on military character unless your memory is stored with ideas associated with the central thought. They must be your own ideas thrashed out in your own mind and organized as the result of your past experience.

Professor James says that will is nothing but attention. Other writers claim that there is something plus attention in the act of willing. They all agree, however, that attention is the basis of willing. Attention is the mental process by which the images of things which interest us get into the mind and dominate it to the exclusion of other ideas. The insane patient who thought he was

Napoleon is an example of attention. The application of this for your purpose is simple. You will a thing because you attend to it, and you attend to it because it interests you. Your interest depends upon an impulse for action—a desire to express yourself in ways that meet your self-approval. At the base of interest is a feeling that certain lines of conduct are worth while and should be made the field of your activities. It resolves itself into a love of, and a desire to make, certain types personal ideals.

Behind interest in any form of activity there may be intelligence or a desire to show off, sometimes a little of each. We have all seen a child jump from a lower step after prefacing the action by an invitation to "See what I can do." I knew a boy who could hold a lighted match in his mouth and let its rays shine through his teeth. To his mind it was quite an effective stunt, especially at night. He called it playing Jack lantern and was never tired of showing off.

In the Southern camps and in Cuba the parades and guard-mounts of the Eighth Massachusetts Infantry were usually attended by admiring spectators. We perfected ourselves in all the stunts laid down in the Drill Regulations and were never too tired to show off when the crowd collected; just because we could do them well we liked to perform, yet there was always an intelligent apprecia-

tion that we were going through a routine which in some way was binding us together and creating a more efficient soldier mass.

In training men, do not let pass an opportunity of letting them go through their paces, if it appeals to their pride and they are doing good work.

General Wood travels to Plattsburg to inspect rookies after they have been at it for a week. He stirs their imagination by judicious commendations. The bank clerks, college professors, and business men enjoy doing the manual and marching before him. Their satisfaction is no less intense than that of the little child who jumps from the lower step. This pleasure is heightened by the idea that they are preparing to do a man's part in defending home and country. They feel that their special brand of soldiering is worth doing for a noble cause. The spirit is good, and every one participating echoes the invitation of youth, "Come on in! The water's fine."

The European war has powerfully stirred us by upsetting many notions about the immunity of America from aggression. The more we learn of happenings in other parts of the world, the more attention we can and do give to military matters. We question our preparedness for war or peace. At heart we desire efficiency and to express ourselves worthily as a nation. Desire and intellect call for action. National interest is aroused. We see

the story of the individual reproduced upon a large scale. The means of stirring interest is the same.

When you become officers, create interest in the men you lead by enlarging their knowledge of and experience in the game, make your exercises evident steps in progress, and connect them in the soldier's mind with ideas of increased efficiency, which can help him and his organization to serve the cause, and above all keep before him the cause as something holy and righteous, worthy of his service.

V

THE STRUGGLE

OUR third phase of character building is the struggle to attain standards. At this stage of a soldier's training he is involved in struggles to acquire military habits and experience as well as to attain ideals. The three struggles are contemporaneous, react upon each other, and are all processes in character building. It is convenient to discuss the three kinds of struggles in the same chapter.

What we wish to accomplish by our struggles are changes and re-arrangements in our bodies. I will explain what I mean by examples. Everyone believes a soldier should know how to shoot. Training him to this involves imparting knowledge of how it should be done and practice in doing it, until the nerves and muscles make the proper adjustments without conscious attention. We make the same kind of struggle to adjust nerves and muscles when we learn to walk, play a piano, or work a typewriter. If the recruit is intended for the cavalry he must learn to

ride. This means practice, until the movements necessary to keep the rider in place become automatic, and take place without conscious effort. The training of nerves and muscles to work for us without attention we call acquiring habits. Like manual training much of military education consists in acquiring useful habits. The struggle in this kind of work is keeping men at training until the movements necessary to attain the standards take place automatically and without conscious attention.

Let us follow our cavalry recruit. He must learn how to care for his horse, scout and patrol with his comrades. Here a new element enters into his education, that of solving problems. Each situation will probably have in it a new feature, but the problems must be solved by some reference to past experience. The light of the past is the only guide to the future. To use an old experience we must have the memory of it in shape to be called up and made available. The solution of many kindred problems does create in the mind a power of rapid revision of past problems and a classification of new problems with reference to former solutions. The actor may not consciously analyze what goes on. He may only know that a decision comes. I call this power organized experience. We see it in all games of sport and in most professions. As experience multiplies, there

comes a time when solutions are made with ease. The process is not so automatic or unconscious as in the practice of something which has become a habit. There is in it, however, the ease and certainty of habit. War is the great game in which organized experience counts. If we had a true military history of this country, it would be the story of low military efficiency, due to the lack of organized experience among officers and men of our armies. In military training much time should be given to practicing the various plays a soldier must make in war, whereby a fund of experience is accumulated and organized, which will be available for quick and accurate decisions. The struggle in this sort of practice is the solution of problems. It requires trained masters to set these problems, guide, and criticise solutions. Under incompetent leadership experience may be organized to court disaster, in the absence of war to stamp a solution with the unmistakable mark of success or failure.

In addition to acquiring desirable habits and organizing military experience there are further struggles which are necessary to attain the mind of a soldier. The recruit has to learn to feel and think like a soldier. Behind his whole life must be created the proper emotional tone. It is marked by the absence of fear, a courageous spirit, cheerfulness, good comradeship, subordination, loyalty,

self-forgetfulness and a willingness to serve and be expended in the desire to conquer. It is often said that these qualities spring from the heart and not from the head. I think this is right if we substitute human nature for the word heart. Intelligence distinguishes between good and evil, paints ideals and discloses means of attaining them, but there is no driving force in intellect. A soldier is a man of action and the great push that leads to action has its main springs in the feelings. I shall later point out that it is in the play of instincts we find the imperative that controls conduct. Instincts are those innate habits which we have inherited from ages of ancestors running back to unknown sources before the Anglo-Saxons.

“Strong with the strength of the race to command,
to obey, to endure.”

A soldier should become an aggregation of tendencies to act in a firm, prompt, and definite way with a courageous spirit in all the principal emergencies which he may encounter. A proper training not only adjusts nerves and muscles in the formation of military habits, but it avails itself of and develops innate combinations and associations of brain cells to insure correct feelings and attain the driving force for correct actions. It has the further purpose of imparting to each soldier

knowledge of his place and part in the life of the organization to which he belongs, and in furnishing him experience with opportunities for practice and for organizing this experience until he develops a capacity to recognize the proper play for the solution of any situation in which he may find himself. These are the three aims of military education and create the conditions which insure success in war.

VI

HABITS

MILITARY authority has always recognized habit as the object of training because of the stable and reliable set it gives to behavior. The fundamental idea of training is the gradual inuring of the soldier to habits that become part of his very nature, by subjecting him and his actions, down to some of the minutest details of daily life, to an unremitting conformity to set orders and regulations.

The Duke of Wellington expressed this aim of military education in his reply to a proposition that habit was second nature. He said, "Habit is ten times nature."

The avowed object of the Prussian system of Frederick the Great was gradually to convert men into machines, and to make obedience, like an instinct, guide their action more powerfully than reason, intelligence, or any physical cause, and place their will power absolutely in the hands of a leader. In this system of instruction, uniformity played a prominent part. Uniformity in dress, in

cut of hair, and in every detail, from the way of lacing the boot to the pattern of a cane to be carried when off duty. Men were subordinated to the will of their leader by winding them about with countless fine threads of petty rules, customs, and restrictions. The soldiers of Frederick developed, what Lieutenant Murray defines as discipline. "That long-continued habit by which the very muscles of the soldier instinctively obey the word of command, so that, under whatever stress of circumstances, dangers, or death, he hears that word of command, even if his mind be too confused and astounded to attend, yet his muscles will obey and obey accurately."

The practices referred to have had a long, dignified, and conspicuous place in military history for their disciplinary value. The result of these practices is evidenced by smartness in dress and carriage, promptness and precision in executing commands, and by a deferential deportment toward seniors. Such appearances are the credentials of a leader's faith in his subordinates.

The methods of imparting these habits are more or less framed upon models that reached their highest development in the armies of Frederick the Great. The old Prussian system was said to be based on fear. Military writers generally agree that this system of training was sound in the days of standing mercenary armies, recruited from the

lowest and sometimes criminal classes, devoid of education and national ideals. The machine-making method is no longer pushed to the extent of destroying the intelligence of the individual man. The modern soldier must take the position of the soldier, and at the same time save his mutton and potatoes from the gutter. Punishments are less rigorous than of old, and are modified to suit the existing state of civilization and education; obedience, however, that will insure that the order to attack will be unhesitatingly obeyed is as important as ever.

An English writer says:—

“The tendency of the present age is to establish a kind of discipline, which may be defined as the habit of ready and hearty obedience, a habit which does not employ inaction in default of orders, but a hearty and loyal application of individual energy and personal initiative, to the furthering of the plans and directions of the commander. The leader, backed by the authority which a higher status, greater knowledge, and the confidence of his men give him, exacts their ready and loyal co-operation in all his intentions and orders. It is the difference between driving and leading. The modern tendency is toward a system of training which develops habits of self-control, pluck, reliance on superiors, and loyal obedience.”

The difference between leading and driving is in

part a matter of understanding what the command means and letting men into the plan of action instead of insisting upon blind obedience. The French General Staff recognize this and have made it a general rule to explain to soldiers as far as possible what is to be done, because men fight better when they know what is expected.

I was taught, when a boy, the difference between driving and leading, by two pictures in a child's book. One represented a negro belaboring a mule with a club, the other pictured the driver saving himself this trouble by adjusting a bunch of hay to a stick, extending between and beyond the mule's ears. In both instances the animal's environments were so manipulated as to cause an advance, but the appeal was made to different instincts. The instinct of fear is a great but not the only master that can lead us to habits of obedience. When we come to study the subject of instincts, we will see how much richer the service has grown, as education has opened up a clearer understanding of the uses that can be made of instincts and their associated sentiments. The advantage that leading has over driving is in its appeal to more elevating and a larger number of compelling impulses. Any appeal to instinct involves manipulating environments and the introduction of elements that control behavior.

The ready and loyal co-operation accorded a

commander, backed by the prestige of greater knowledge, recognizes in part the human tendency to follow a leader, whose strong personality captivates, and whose purposes dominate, instilling, by contagion among his followers, his will to do. The etymology of the word "discipline" refers to habits acquired by a disciple in the service of a master.

In educating you to command, the emphasis is placed upon the higher status necessary to win confidence and a following. One of the purposes of the School is to impress upon you the necessity of attaining a higher status before you can exercise command as a natural right.

The value of habit is predicated on this characteristic. It insures precision and quickness in execution, and standardizes men so that their actions can be estimated with a degree of certainty. It implies a repetition of customary acts; it minimizes fatigue, fret, and worry, and the amount of conscious attention. If acts did not become easier by repetition, life would be very limited in its activities. What a mess we should all be in if the fastening of a button was as difficult on each occasion as when as children we first learned to do it! If the acts of daily dressing absorbed our whole attention and energy as when we first learned to dress, we should exhaust ourselves shaving, washing, and getting into our clothes, and probably con-

sume the whole day in getting ready for its work. An old doggerel illustrates the imaginary confusion of a centipede when questioned about its habits:

“The centipede was happy quite
Until the toad in fun
Said, ‘Pray which leg comes after which
When you begin to run?’
This wrought her mind to such a pitch
She lay distracted in the ditch
Considering how to run.”

We should be similarly distracted if the question was sprung upon us, which stocking goes on first, how shoes are laced, or which lap of the collar goes over and which under, we could not tell the order in which the motions are made without an actual rehearsing.

The mechanism by which well-trained men are managed and controlled is most wonderful and efficient. The nervous system is a colony of some billion cells crowded together in the brain and spinal cord. Hairlike nerves connect these cells with each other and with various parts of the body. Some of these nerves receive and carry impulses inward, others carry impulses outward to the muscles, while others make interior connection between the cells.

You may find a comrade asleep with a bare foot extending beyond the blanket. You take a feather and tickle the foot, it kicks. The feather has irritated a touch spot in the skin, the excitation passed inward over a sensory nerve to a transfer station in the spinal column, where it was switched to a motor nerve. This motor nerve carried it outward to the muscles, the muscles contracted and the man kicked.

The simplest actions of men and animals are excited by some stimulus in the external world. We can think of the nervous system as an intricate telephone system forever tingling with Liliputian but important business. The eyeball, ear, or some other touch spot becomes stimulated, immediately the news is telephoned in to a central in the spinal chord over an ingoing wire, central if well trained, decides what is to be done and immediately telephones directions to the appropriate muscles by an outgoing wire. The muscles get busy and the proper action takes place. Sensory nerves are always carrying messages to the centrals in the spinal chord. These centrals never sleep, but are always sending out orders over motor nerves. In a trained spinal chord consciousness plays a comparatively small part in our daily activities. During most of the time the intricate telephone system runs itself. We are born with spinal chords which can and do attend to a great many things without

consulting reason. With practice they learn to do more. The smallest baby will kick if irritated by a pin. A trained soldier will respond to a word of command going through the several motions expected. He does this without thought. We say he does it instinctively. The first time the movement was explained to him and he heard the order of execution, the command was telephoned in, some central in the spine was puzzled, it had to relay the information to the brain for consideration. The brain is the highest authority in the nervous system. When anything new comes into a central, the central connects with "Information," which is the brain, and sends the message up to be thought over. The brain is the general office for information and direction about new problems. Central may call upon the brain several times for help about a new problem, but will finally grasp what is expected and will attend to the matter regularly without intruding upon consciousness. This is what we experience as beginners when we start to learn any game requiring the co-ordination of muscles. By practice the right neural paths get into the habit of working together, so as to innervate the right muscles to the proper degree, at the proper time and in the proper order. When this is done we have acquired a habit, and consciousness can either go off and attend to some other job, letting the machinery run itself, or, sit

back exercising the functions of a general superintendent who has nothing to do when everything moves smoothly.

Control by consciousness demands attention to the process on hand, and some kind of voluntary manipulation of the switches by which some paths are opened and others closed. This requires effort and entails fatigue. As conscious superintendents we get tired when we have to work, attending to and directing these processes. It is here that the value of habit enters. Below the level of consciousness lie the routine managers or sub-foremen in the various centrals in the spinal chord. Once they have learned an often repeated stimulus they need not tire consciousness for directions. As long as they act without calling on the brain for thought and direction, they respond in the shortest possible time and always in exactly the same way.

The process of habit forming is relatively simple, but is of the most far-reaching importance in the field of military life. Drill is constantly forging chains of responses which in time the strongest impulses find difficult and often impossible to break. Habit is the very heart of military discipline. It must be established by persistent travel of excitations along the same old neural paths, in the same old way. There can be no change, no variation, no variety, but the everlasting repetition in one way. This is tedious and

monotonous. It cannot be otherwise. The nervous system demands it. The explanation is that the combination of muscles involved in movements requires the co-ordination of many nerves and cells. The necessary excitation must travel over certain and definite neural paths to produce correct actions. Practice accustoms the right nerves and cells to work together. Each time the act is performed there is some change which strengthens the combination and decreases the chances of an excitation going astray, and exciting wrong paths. After many repetitions the connections become so close that whenever the proper sensory nerve is excited, the impulse spreads over a well worn pathway to the nerves and cells that have been acting together and the combination grows more and more to constitute what is practically a single structure. The formation of habit is thus a process of wearing down and establishing well defined paths in the nervous system. Every time an excitation goes astray the combination is injured, because it increases the likelihood of a similar derailment at the same spot. For this reason in correct military life a subordinate is never excused from dereliction of duty, and exceptions are never made. Abhorrence of exceptions is the keynote of military training.

Once a soldier is well trained he can be depended upon to work like a machine with preci-

sion and unerring certainty, provided consciousness, thought and reason will leave the sub-foremen alone to run the various centrals in the spine as they have been taught. These sub-foremen are the slaves of habit. When they have once learned a routine they never ask the brain for further direction. If left alone by the brain nothing short of destruction will intrude upon the performance of their duties as they have been learned and practiced.

The old system of discipline required a man to use his brains until he had learned his duties, but after the sub-foremen who run the spinal centrals had learned all that was expected of them, it attempted to prevent any interference by the brain in the established routine. Thinking was bad form. It suggested dangers and inspired fear. It put two and two together and reasoned from cause to effect. It interfered with the work of the sub-foremen, made things go wrong, and often destroyed the efficiency of the machine. Under the old order thinking was discouraged and suppressed as the foe of habit.

The problem of suppressing thought is difficult and often unnecessary. Thought is often paralyzed in combat by a passion that sweeps men forward in a lust to kill. We read of this in many accounts from the Western front where one side or the other "goes over the top" in an assault.

The kind of thinking, however, which is really dangerous in military life is the thought of fear. There is a kind of thinking that does not interfere with, but is the ally of military habit. Professor Edward S. Morse, relates a talk which he had with a high ranking Japanese officer some years ago when Japan was changing her system and admitting common people to service in the army upon the same plane with the Samurai class. The Professor asked what would be the effect upon the man in the street and if he could be relied upon to fight. He was told that no one knew, but it was hoped that the honor conferred by opening the door for his advancement would inspire him to imitate the Samurai and prove himself worthy of a fighting place in their ranks. The forecast was correct and the common man made good. He had something to think about which excluded the thought of fear.

The fatalism of some men and their indifference to death make them first-class fighting material. There is a coarsening and hardening which comes from a rough life and constant exposure to perils which intensifies the force of habit. What thinking goes on has little effect upon the iron bands which have incased life. The little thinking done by the soldiers of Frederick the Great was probably to the effect that fighting the enemy was easier than kicking against the discipline of

the Prussian army.

In Cromwell's "model army" there were many devout men who believed that God had a plan for every human soul. A soldier who believes that he is thus personally selected to do a fighting part usually has sufficient faith to be indifferent to life or death. Personally it must be well whatever happens. The thought of such a soldier never interferes with or upsets his habit of discipline.

The effect of thinking upon military habits depends upon the character of the thinker and the kind of thinking indulged in. Thinking may strengthen or weaken habit. Thinking which interferes with habit is bad from a military point of view. Correct habits make a good soldier. This is the old idea. If we aid to correct habits, right thinking and feeling to back good habits, we have a better soldier. This is the modern idea. Right thinking and feeling without correct habits is a useless combination. Habit, however, may become too strong to be broken by any thinking or any interference from the brain. Rip Van Winkle often promised to reform but his sub-foremen insisted upon their daily allowance of grog and got it. Good habits are as persistent as bad ones and are as hard to break. This is the basic value of habit as a military asset.

VII

MILITARY HABITS

THE process of acquiring any habit is usually analyzed and expressed in four maximums.

- 1 Select the habit.
- 2 Demonstrate the habit.
- 3 Secure abundant and genuine practice with every effort of will and attention directed to acquiring the habit.
- 4 Allow no exceptions.

I. SELECTION OF HABIT

The military habits you are expected to acquire are prescribed in orders or are traditional in the Service. Discipline may be defined in terms of habit as embracing all habits desirable for the economical management of an army and the fitting of men for field service. The course of training should aim wisely to manipulate the environment of a soldier so as to develop in him, without waste of time or effort, the valuable habits desired. These are:—

- A. Military bearing.
- B. Military courtesy.
- C. Putting forth physical and mental efforts.
High level of efforts.
- D. Self-control: mental and physical control.
- E. Neatness and order.
- F. Smartness, exactness, and promptness.
- G. Subconscious obedience.
- H. Mental alertness and confidence.
- I. Team work in practices useful in campaign
and in battle, which insures tactical cohesion.

A. Military Bearing

The smart carriage, which should always characterize soldiers, has been evolved as the most practical position of readiness. It is the most economical position as it best sustains and carries the weight of the body and gives the organs the utmost freedom and ease in functioning. A military bearing is so associated with mental alertness and confidence, as to have become the outward and visible sign of an inner excellence.

In riot duty, the military bearing of an armed force and its precision in drill are elements in maintaining order. In the popular mind, efficiency is so predicated upon appearance that a well-drilled body, by its machine-like precision, often paralyzes the activity of a mob. During the

Pennsylvania strikes in 1877 a company of engineers, under command of Captain William R. Livermore, was marching through a turbulent district in one of the cities. They were surrounded by a mob of strike sympathizers, who hurled abuse and missiles at the soldiers as they were passing a defile made by piles of lumber on either side of a street. To steady his men, the captain halted the company and executed a few movements in the manual. The company was closely watched by the rioters, who stopped their fusillade, to see what the soldiers were doing. In the hush that followed the cessation of activities, nothing was heard except the captain's voice giving commands and the rattle of arms in the manual. Suddenly a shrill voice called, "Look out for them, they ain't militia with bouquets in their guns." A stampede was inaugurated, the rioters fell back and kept a respectful distance. They suddenly acquired an exaggerated idea of the efficiency of the soldiers by their precise drill and military bearing.

During the Chelsea fire another incident occurred, illustrating the effect of soldierly bearing. One of the State troops clad in a misfit overcoat, and uncertain of his movements, while acting as sentinel, warned back a crowd from passing a certain street. The crowd walked over him. In an adjoining street a marine on guard, no larger than

the State sentinel, but with a natty, set-up and well-fitting uniform, diverted the crowd by sharply coming to port arms, and directing them in peremptory tones to pass the other way.

B. Military Courtesy

All rules of military courtesy have for their object the due subordination of juniors to seniors. Due deference to rank impresses the soldier rendering the courtesy and his comrades who see it. Proper deference recognizes and creates a prestige which makes obedience easy. Courtesy will be discussed later when we speak of the instinct of subordination.

C. High Level of Effort

In all walks of life precept urges the steady application of one's best efforts to the work in hand. A high level of effort should be as much a part of an officer's make-up as the uniform is part of his clothing. Whenever interest flags, we feel a loss of force and the need of a renewed initiative. An officer must maintain his interest, or at least, force himself in the going as if his interest had not abated. As a leader and school master he must always be giving more than he receives from his men. This is the price of suc-

cess. Unless he is capable of such an effort he will fail in the most important work of an officer.

In the early days of monasticism the monks of Egypt, who had fled to the desert to escape the sins of the world, found a new sin awaiting them which they called "accidie," meaning literally, without interest. In the midst of prayers and fastings they were overcome with indifference and questioned the value of all their doings. I have found "accidie" existing as a contagious sin among military officers. It is a miserable sin. I remember an attack in a militia regiment which was controlled by securing at West Point the services of a tactical officer. The officer was correct in dress, bearing, deportment, full of military knowledge, untiring in his zeal to impart it, and over-flowing with joy in the work of teaching. As an example he was inspiring and became a model for imitation.

President Garfield is reported to have said that his idea of a college was Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other. My idea of a military company is a collection of men dominated and controlled by the personal worth of the officer at the head, who leads by virtue of a power to inspire and sustain interest in the work and to compel submission to the routine which establishes military habits. Such an officer must be immune to "accidie" and never tolerate its

appearance in a subordinate.

D. Self-Control

The foundation of military subordination is self-control. Every one recognizes that without it the exercise of command is impossible. The two great enemies of efficiency, hurry and worry, are conquered by self-control. I have seen many officers go to pieces by fretting themselves over difficulties which have not been anticipated and have seemed overwhelming. Much trouble can be avoided by studying problems in advance and by a careful consideration of probabilities, but with all preparation things happen which have not been foreseen or guarded against. The state of mind in which one encounters these vexations is all important. A quiet controlled mind is necessary to reason oneself out of difficulties. If we begin to fret and worry confusion increases and what capacity we have to extricate ourselves is paralyzed.

E. Neatness and Order

Habits of neatness and order conserve health, make for regularity, and insure smooth working of routine. The very acquisition of these habits is valuable training in self-control. The move-

ments and deployments of an army require order. There must be a place for everything and everything must be in its place. The preparation for successful maneuvering begins with training the individual in the little details of his housekeeping and personal care.

F. Smartness, Exactness and Promptness

The School of the Soldier, Squad, and Company introduces the beginner to military life. In all the exercises of these Schools there is a twofold purpose, an attempt to make habitual such acts as are useful in field service, and at the same time to instil habits of precise and prompt obedience. This twofold purpose is often lost sight of because our peace practices are not linked up in experience with service conditions.

As we perform in armories, our manual of arms and close-order drill have no distinctive features which differentiate them from a wand-drill and an Amazonian march by a corps de ballet.

The Maine guide trudges through the woods with his rifle on shoulder and pack on back. He has accustomed his muscles to the weight. This is the soldier's job, to march and carry his weapon and supplies. Few militia organizations do this, and even the regulars grumble at practice marches, yet the *raison d'être* of the manual of arms

is not alone an exhibition in agility, but an attempt to make the soldier and his rifle shipmates, to inure and develop the muscles so that they bear the weight as lightly and easily as one wears a hat, and to co-ordinate all the muscles in the movements necessary to make the motions of loading, aiming, firing, and handling the piece habitual. The same training is necessary to fit the muscles of the back and shoulders to carry the loaded pack or roll. Under the conditions of our armory work we are apt to lose sight of the real purpose of the manual drill. In passing we do not even touch the high places. The purpose is to harden and accustom the muscles to burden-bearing, and to train the nerves and muscles to co-operate in the habitual reactions which make the soldier prompt and skillful in handling the tools of his trade.

In all exercises in the School of the Squad and Company, each man is required to perform his movements in a space restricted by definite bounds. Each man has his place and is told how to get there. By constant drill, he is practiced to take and hold it without confusion and on time. One appreciates the necessity of this kind of drill on taking part in the march of a division at war strength with its trains. The immense space of road occupied, and the necessity of every unit being in its place and starting promptly, em-

phasize the need of this careful preliminary training for each individual. A standardization is essential for success. The elements of road space and avoidance of confusion upon the march are behind the requirement of precise execution of the drill of foot troops. The difference in the drill of soldiers and sailors illustrates the requirements of the two services; the sailor is expected to move promptly, but is allowed to do his work in any efficient manner. There is no danger of his wandering away from his ship or getting mixed with other troops. The vessel and not the man is the unit of space on the ocean. In the infantry drill of small commands, we are apt to forget that it is a preparation for concentration of masses on a large field of operation on time and in an orderly manner. It is also an exercise to train individuals in habits of obedience, precision, and promptness.

The manual of arms and drill in close order are the kinder-garten work of soldiers. There is a tendency to substitute the easy work in these fields for the intensive training necessary to make real soldiers. You often hear the friends of military drill in our public schools exaggerate the disciplinary value of, and extol, company drill and the manual of arms as exercises which develop self-control and a manly spirit. They develop about as much self-control and manly spirit

as an imposed task in the conjugation of irregular verbs. As physical exercises both are poor, because they make too gentle demands upon the larger muscles of the body. The object of physical training is the development of health, strength, and a stable nervous system. The usual company drill as practiced is too soft an exercise to contribute to these ends.

We have seen that the monotonous practice in the manual of arms has a professional military value for a soldier in making him familiar with his rifle as the tool of his trade, and that squad and company drill teaches him to maintain an allotted place in his organization which enables large bodies to get around in an orderly manner, and on time. This preliminary work is necessary, and as it has to be done, we try to put into it as much discipline as possible, and we do get in a large amount. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that these exercises have a greater disciplinary value than many other exercises and practices used in military life.

G. Subconscious Obedience

The word "subconscious" first appears in the 1911 edition of our Drill Regulations. It refers to nerve and muscle activities which go on in the body below the level of consciousness. Some

of these movements are beyond the recognition of consciousness, while others can and usually do go on without conscious recognition or control. By repetition the lower nerve centers have been taught to take charge as sub-foremen and run the works. The automatic character of subconscious obedience is a military asset because the ordinary stimuli to action in the outer world become an order to these sub-foremen within us, who are always on duty and ready to obey, unless inhibited by higher authority. They start action without a touch from consciousness, and set in motion forces which carry through a whole routine of movements. The nerve centers, like thousands of faithful sentinels, stand waiting the customary signal, which with the precision of machinery they transmit, and innervate muscles to habitual activity. Efficient men are like cavalry horses who have lost their riders; they go forward in the charge, doing the duties they have learned, without a sign that the possibility of an alternative even suggests itself to their minds. The subconscious obedience demanded by our Drill Regulations is an attribute of an educated backbone, in whose spinal column and connections nerve centers which usually operate below the level of consciousness have become by training sensitive to the word of command, and touch off the muscular innervations necessary for action.

The habit of subconscious obedience can be acquired only by training. What capacity we have slumbers within us, and is aroused and developed only by action. Conduct must at first be imposed from without, then finally the outward requirements become transformed into personal volition. The element of time is an important factor, because psychological growth and development are involved. The intensive training and requisite time for practical results are rarely found outside regular establishments, or unless troops have been a long time in service. Training is a process of hammering in which all derelictions must be noticed and meet an automatic and impersonal punishment. It is only a question of being led or driven—usually a mixed treatment, the proportion of either depending upon the recruit.

You do not find subconscious obedience as a rule in the militia. With us obedience is a matter of consent. Militia obey because they feel in a general way that obedience is part of the game, and it is right to obey orders; when, however, they fail to see the necessity and reason for an order, or when an order goes against their strong inclinations, the militia is full of revolt and insubordination.

There is nowhere behind our system the necessary force, which is the schoolmaster imposing conduct and making us respect orders because of

the consequence of disobedience. There is nowhere the intensive training by which the nervous system develops subconscious foremen who attend to the job of obedience; there is very little of the spirit and inspiration of the officer whose personality thrills and dominates. These are the forces which compel submission and make obedience habitual.

H. Mental Alertness

Manual training is intimately connected with brain development. The right-handed man thinks with the left hemisphere of his brain, and the left-handed man with the right hemisphere. The nerve connections between hands and brain are the great inlets for the stimuli which arouse and develop mental capacity.

The trained athlete carries his head and body erect and moves with an assurance which is the physiological expression of joy in the confidence of his strength and power. As we look at him we at once see that he is strong in the will to do and dare. We notice in all his movements the directness and certainty which are the result of coördinated muscular training. When we see him in action, absorbed in his special game, we recognize a mental alertness and quick response to the exigencies of the play. This alertness is

the result of a training which has opened numerous pathways in the brain. He perceives more things and recognizes their connection with his activities. The world is rich in happenings, which are full of significance for those who apperceive them. The mentally alert see more things and appreciate their significance. The difference between the alert and the stupid is that between a miner and a hen finding a diamond. The precious stone has a different meaning for each.

The drill-sergeant said to the rookie, "The brass tacks of soldiering is to get legs that will keep you up with the bunch and muscles to carry your load, and then to learn to keep yourself fit." This, however, is not the whole object of smartness and precision in physical development. The acquisition of mental alertness and confidence are important products of manual training. The strong man shows his character in actions, his personality is an entirety made up of ideas, feelings, and tendencies. These attributes act and react upon each other. In our system of education, we work backward. By outward compulsion we impose a system of physical training, which by repetition fixes habits of doing, which react upon feeling and volition, until, absorbed and blended with the inner life, they become fixtures of character. The story is one of backward evolution.

I. Team Work

No military unit lives unto itself alone. Each is in the game to help others and to be helped by others. All contribute in dealing one blow. It is the application of the co-ordinated strength of each to a common end which creates tactical cohesion. The habit of helping and looking for the opportunity to help should be practiced from the very beginning of field training. Always act as a member of a team, know the mission of the team, and play for the success of that mission. In all maneuvers I have seen, there has been a lack of tactical cohesion. The commanders of contact troops, from patrols to higher units failed to report. The three principal arms undertook private hunts of their own, and every unit which could find an opportunity separated itself in some independent enterprise of its own. I have known an outpost to chase the enemy for miles. Tactical cohesion is the most difficult lesson to learn, so difficult, that every officer should be grounded from the beginning of his training in the idea of team work and always team work.

II. DEMONSTRATION OF HABIT

The first instruction given recruits on joining should be in the form of a lecture from an officer,

explaining the reasons that make it necessary to subject soldiers to restrictions which do not exist in civil life, the necessity for discipline in the field, on the march, and in quarters, and the system of administering discipline under authority of the law.

Before a soldier can automatically acquire the mental or physical reaction desired, it is necessary to explain and illustrate to him what is wanted. If an idea, it can be made clear by concrete examples. The story of the old soldier and his mutton illustrates subconscious obedience, carried to absurd extremes.

In the Training School, you have seen military courtesy taught by little dramas. Groups of cadets have been given properties such as pipes, bags, canes, and umbrellas, and told to pass an officer, and their conduct has been criticized. The students have been shown absurd performances as examples of what to avoid, and correct performance to serve as memory pictures and standards to be followed.

Among the elements of habit is often the exercise of muscles in a definite order of succession, as in loading, aiming, and firing. Charts and pictures may serve as standards of comparison.

The instructor should know in advance, from his own study of the habit and his past experience, the nature of the mistakes likely to be made.

This knowledge should be taken advantage of in economical teaching, and probable mistakes pointed out in advance, or difficult points mastered by preliminary movements. The soldier should be called upon to demonstrate what he understands is necessary to be done, and every error or omission in his interpretation should be corrected. A correct initial performance should be stamped with approval. The experience of a correct execution should be made as intense and vivid as possible.

Infantry Drill Regulations, par. 48, prescribes:

"The instructor explains briefly each movement, first executing it himself if practicable. He requires the recruits to take the proper positions unassisted, and does not touch them for the purpose of correcting them, except when they are unable to correct themselves. He avoids keeping them too long at the same movement, although each should be understood before passing to another. He exacts by degrees the desired precision and uniformity."

The best demonstration of habit is to get a good model and imitate it. We are prone to follow suit. Some member of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment in Porto Rico looped up the front of his campaign hat with a Spanish cockade, and the whole regiment came home sporting in this way the Spanish colors. The Fifth Massachu-

setts Regiment visited Canada and every man returned with a swagger stick. About football season high school boys affect long hair and parade a bushy forelock under a cap which looks too small for the wearer. I remember when studying law some of us admired an advocate, who brushed his hair forward above the ears and wore a Pickwickian waistcoat. Some of us testified to our admiration of his excellence as an advocate by imitating his peculiarity of dress and hair. We imitate what appeals to us, or the performances of those who impress us with their excellence. We should profit by this tendency to copy, furnish good models for imitation, and let nature take its course. Nature, however, needs careful watching and guidance to direct attention to what is worthy of imitation.

The tendency to imitate has an affinity for certain instincts. In the case of the noted lawyer we were somewhat curious to know how he excelled and in our attempt to find out, we unconsciously imitated peculiarities that did not count. The high school boy with the football hair is only a whit less foolish. Long hair may count as padding against a head blow, but unless he contemplates a football scrimmage he copies the wrong thing. We all need a guide and friend to interest us in proper models and point out the various details for imitation. After this School

had the advantage of Major Koehler's drill at West Point I saw two examples which illustrate the necessity for the careful supervision of students. During a visit to the Cambridge armory I saw one of our cadets putting a class of business men through what he called the "Koehler Cure." The instructor had learned that a teacher must put into his work more than he takes out and was expending his energies in imitation of his West Point prototype. He seemed to know his business and was getting his ideas across to the class and having them translated into action. At another armory I saw a cadet undertaking similar work. He knew the commands and possibly how they ought to be executed, but had learned nothing else in the art of teaching. A Victor record of Koehler's commands would have made a better instructor. He reminded me of a Frenchman, who once visited the headquarters of the Eighth Regiment and asked for some "commandments" to give a temperance society during a street parade. He was accommodated with a string of some dozen commands in regimental drill. Afterwards I saw his society, uniformed in white gloves and canes, pass the reviewing stand. During the passage the leader kept up a continuous babel of loud sounds, in which I recognized—"Column of fours, break from the right to march to the left, close column on first division,

right in front, change direction on first company, companies right half turn, guide right," etc., etc. The "commandments" were all there according to Upton's Drill Regulations, but the men did nothing but march forward in a ragged column of squads.

III. GENUINE PRACTICE

You have heard it said, "Hell is paved with good intentions." In like manner, the story of the State militia is a tale of good intentions. Nothing ever happened in the old days of training in the way of military practice to make soldiers. Listen to this description of two field days:—

"Thursday, August 6, 1829, the Company entertained the Boston Light Infantry. The visitors were escorted to the Salem Common where an encampment was pitched. The Boston Company remained over night, and on Tuesday morning in company with the Salem Corps, partook of a splendid *déjeuner à la fourchette*. The morning repast prepared by Remond would have done honor to the renowned Louis Eustache himself. Later the two companies marched to the country seat of Major William P. Endicott in Danvers, where an elegant collation awaited them. Tables were laid under the trees in a wide avenue, and

were nobly furnished with the delicacies of the season, and sparkling champagne and Madeira were freely dispensed and temperately enjoyed. From Major Endicott's the two companies marched to Dustin's Tavern, where the officers of the Danvers Light Infantry entertained them. The Boston Company then took up the line of march to Boston via Lynn Mineral Springs, and the Salem Light Infantry returned to their armory."

I hope Lynn went no license that year and that the Boston soldiers found relief at the Mineral Springs. I have no doubt the good major thought his wines a substantial contribution to military preparedness, and intended them as an oblation to the warlike spirit of the militia.

An idea, even if a great one, is an inert thing until a person utters it in terms of life. Religion, as well as psychology, places the true emphasis upon doing. "Therefore, whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock."

Intentions are lifeless, and leave no lasting impression unless they work themselves out in action. It is the actual doing that causes the waves of re-arrangement to leave a permanent impression upon the nervous system. If you bear in mind the mechanical process which is supposed

to occur in the formation of habit, the reason and necessity for genuine practice is apparent. The most plausible explanation is that the passage of an impulse inward to the nervous system, and then outward to the muscles, leaves a pathway, which every repetition makes more permeable. An impulse which has traversed the path once, travels the same way more readily a second time. Practice is repeated travel over the same old path, by which the trail is deepened, so that future excitations produced by the same sort of stimuli in the outer world, following the line of least resistance, pass the same old way and reproduce the same old action.

The recognition of this principle brings us back to the Roman rule of military training: "All their sports were bloodless battles, and all their battles bloody sports." We should make the object of our practice the things useful in campaign or battle. Everything that does not contribute to these ends is valueless.

In the list of habits given as of military value, you will notice that you can train for them under almost any conditions and circumstances. The prerequisite for success is to go at them with vehemence and enthusiasm.

It is difficult to acquire the habit of putting forth physical and mental effort, when everything moves with precision and regularity. The ma-

neuvers of the militia in southeastern Massachusetts, and again in Essex County, introduced us to opportunities of practice in this habit. The rain was as wet and the mud as soft as in real war. The conditions of combat games call for self-control, loyalty, and team work. The value of maneuvers lies in the fact that they create opportunities for practice under conditions approximating war.

Whenever time and expense are important elements in training, it will be found wise to press training at a high tension as long as progress is steady and upward. A period is reached when the law of diminishing returns applies. This law is usually represented graphically by a curve. During the first few weeks of practice the curve of learning shows a gradual rise, then fluctuates, moving up and down for some time along approximately the same level, before it begins again to show a steady upward swing. At the point where the law of diminishing returns begins to operate, which is the point where steady progress ceases, it is more economical to cut off practice, and close the period of training until the student has organized what has been required and is again ready for rapid progress. The period during which intensive training is profitable is from four to six weeks. The students' and business men's camps conducted under United States Army aus-

pices are planned to last for the period during which intensive training is profitable.

Men who have studied the processes of habit-formation in a practical way tell us that a week of intensive training is not a lasting foundation upon which subsequent progress can be superimposed. It takes more than a week to begin to acquire habits, and shutting off training at the end of a week offers so many opportunities to unlearn what has been acquired, that unlearning begins at once and dissipates quickly the accumulation of a single week. If you apply this to the Massachusetts militia, with our ten days of camp and periodical armory drills, you see why under present methods we turn out soldiers of a low-grade efficiency.

Professor William Ernest Hocking, in his testimony before the Special Commission on Military Education and Reserve, testified: —

“It is of no use to take dribblets of time and expect to accomplish anything serious in any kind of training.

“It is fair to say that a man does not begin to get into the habits of a soldier until he has been at it a month; two weeks just turns the edge. And to have a man go to camp for a week and then have an hour a week for a year for drills is wasteful from the point of view of learning. It would be better to have a month in camp for two sum-

mers and to drop out the intervening training altogether."

IV. ALLOW NO EXCEPTIONS

In speaking of the formation of habit, Professor James says:—

"Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life. Each lapse is like the letting fall of a ball of string which one is carefully winding up; a single slip undoes more than a great many turns will wind again. Continuity of training is the great means of making the nervous system act infallibly right.

"The Hell to be endured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than the Hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way. Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habit, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its ever so little scar. The drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself for every fresh dereliction by saying, 'I won't count this time!' Well! he may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none the

less. Down among his nerve cells and fibers the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. Of course, this has its good side as well as its bad one. As we become permanent drunkards by so many separate drinks, so we become saints in the moral, and authorities and experts in the practical and scientific, spheres, by so many separate acts and hours of work."

In the growth of moral character we begin by imposing upon ourselves certain actions to gratify the expectations of parents and teachers; we do this for the sole purpose of appearing good. Repeated actions create ideas and feelings, and we end by regulating our conduct to meet the demands of our own ideals. We begin by acting as if we were good; we end by being good. This represents the military process. The recruit is made to act and look like a soldier. The conduct imposed from without becomes in the end second nature.

The imposition of conduct from without involves the element of compulsion. There must be behind any efficient system the means of control which overawes. This has always been a basic principle in military instruction, and it is always necessary to lodge, somewhere behind train-

ing, a power which can compel obedience and prevent exceptions. All derelictions noticed should be punished.

The system of punishment which is the basis of training should be automatic and impersonal: impersonal from the standpoint of the punishing authority. In the Training School you have an example of such a system in your so-called "skin list." A long catalogue of possible faults is tabulated and demerits assigned to each default. The tactical officers are supposed to be men keen in detecting these faults, and in reporting them to the disadvantage of each offender. You realize that the officer is doing this, not from any personal ill-will or dislike, but as a part of a system which is intended to be of assistance to you in forming correct military habits. You feel that you are submitting to a government of law and not of men. The "skin list" is intended to be automatic and impersonal, and represents a system by which men are trained into a state where obedience becomes habitual. Obedience of this sort is established and maintained by a system of intensive training, which allows no dereliction of duty, however small, to escape notice and punishment.

To control an army great power must be vested somewhere and used when occasion demands.

VIII

INSTINCTS

SOME time ago a woodsman told me of seeing from some vantage-point a contest between a herd of some kind of deer and a pack of wolves. At the first note of alarm the does and fawns huddled and the bucks formed a ring about them presenting a gallant front. Each took his place in the fighting line automatically and in response to a law of his nature. We also respond to such law. In time of public danger an imperative impulse, which cannot be denied, places us, like the bucks, in the outer ring, facing the enemies of the Republic. Prepared or unprepared, you will find your places in the fighting line.

To instruct men you must understand them. When a man acts, what makes him do one thing rather than another? No one of us is exactly like another, yet all conform more or less to a common type. We recognize that we have tendencies to respond in similar ways to the same situations: to eat when hungry, to sleep when

tired, to fight when mad, to run when frightened, etc., etc. These impulses to act alike are obviously connected with some common material fact in human anatomy.

I shall assume in these talks that men are born like animals with certain instincts, and that they acquire other tendencies by developing these instincts, and that these inherited and acquired dispositions are the causes of feeling and acting. A good part of our motives in acting is the satisfaction of these dispositions. When we attempt to control or stir others to action, we appeal by reason or other means to these impulses, dispositions, and tendencies. Among the instincts commonly appealed to in military life are:—

1. Pugnacity.
2. Emulation.
3. Play.
4. Self-assertion.
5. Subordination.
6. Gregariousness.
7. Fear.

Instinct is defined as “An innate disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to

act in regard to it in a particular manner or at least to experience an impulse to such action."

We are told that at a certain period in its life the solitary wasp will seize a certain kind of caterpillar, will sting it in a particular way, lay her egg in it, carry it to her nest, and wall it up in a particular manner. She does this but once in her life, and after her death a young wasp is born which in its turn goes through the same ritual. An imperious force causes her to react in this manner to her environment and to perform this series of acts, about the result and meaning of which she can know nothing. It cannot be habit, as these acts were never performed by this particular wasp before, or the result of education, as there is nothing leading up to it. We say it is instinct.

When an instinct is called into play, there is a stimulus, either an external or internal physical occurrence, which excites paths in the nervous system, the result of which is muscular action. In the case of the wasp, I suppose the weight of the ripened egg, the sight or smell of the caterpillar, are in part the stimuli which excite receptor neurones, which innervate muscles to action. The wasp is born with the appropriate pathways open to receive and transmit the stimuli. The mechanism of her nervous system is prepared and the various switches set to transfer the impulses to

the appropriate muscles, in the order in which they require innervation, to perform the various acts in the series. We call this an innate tendency, but can go no further in our explanation. We recognize that the wasp displays no intelligence. She does not know why she is acting in the particular manner, or what she is going to do next; she neither has in mind any end to be served by her activities nor adapts her actions to any end. She goes off much as a firecracker explodes when the fuse is lighted. She acts in this way because she has inherited a nervous system with ready-made grooves over which the impulses pass which produce action. Instinct is really an inherited habit.

The value and use of animal instincts lie in their protective functions. They are mostly connected with reproduction, food-getting, and avoiding danger. In the normal course of life the instinctive actions are not performed once only, as in the case of the wasp, but are indefinitely repeated, as the animal overcomes or avoids its enemies, and satisfies its hunger or other needs.

In the higher animals instinctive acts are modified by experience. Some animals, especially in hunting or in being hunted, seem to have a notion of an end and to adapt their actions to that end. The old fox feels the irresistible driving force which compels him to seek the chickens, but mem-

ory of steel traps and associations with the hateful man-smell make him modify his approach and develop cunning in the realization of his purpose. The goal he seeks is determined by his nature, but the means of gratifying his cravings are modified by past experiences.

Men like other animals are born with innate tendencies to action. They are more richly endowed with them than is any other animal, and a superior intelligence enables men, by developing these tendencies, to acquire other tendencies, whose qualities differ so much from those of the parent instinct that it is difficult to trace the relationship. These inherited and acquired dispositions furnish the driving force which is the push behind conduct. Pure reason, by its own unaided effort, has not in the slightest degree power to set muscles in action. The dynamic fact in human conduct is the organization of pathways in the nervous system which act like fuses in transmitting forces which result in action. Each disposition has its own organization of nerves, that respond to the appropriate stimuli and produce the feeling tones and actions which are characteristic of the particular disposition. Our real motive in acting is to satisfy these tendencies by performing the appropriate acts and experiencing the appropriate emotions.

Men differ from other animals in their freer

use of intelligence. They can more clearly anticipate the ends which gratify dispositions and hold these ends more constantly in view while selecting ways and means for attaining them. Superior intelligence gives a greater power of supervision over details, and of comparing the various modes of attaining the object. It does not accelerate the vehemence of pursuit, but regulates its direction, and points out the road by which we shall proceed to our goal. There is not the blind rush into action which characterizes the lower forms of life. There is a widening of the time interval between the beginning and the end of the process, during which the impulse may be side-tracked or inhibited.

This may happen in three ways. It may be an impulse to act contrary to the organized body of ideas which constitutes character, and so finds the door of entrance slammed in its face. A better way of putting this is to say that the subject has so modified his natural disposition that he no longer perceives or pays attention to stimuli of this kind, and the receptor neurones are closed to their passage.

Another method of side-tracking is where the impulse finds a lodgment, but collides with another impulse and is bowled out before it gets a real inning. This is the condition where conflicting instincts contend for the possession of the

field. I had an interesting experience which illustrates this kind of contest in the animal world. Some years ago, while walking across a cranberry bog in the dusk of a foggy afternoon, I came up the wind and on to six deer. We discovered each other simultaneously. I immediately slowed down and moved quietly through the fog, which in the twilight blurred objects at a short distance. The animals followed on a line parallel to my course. They seemed curious to find out what sort of thing I was, yet afraid to come nearer to satisfy that curiosity. Their instinct of fear and curiosity balanced, until, not minding my steps, I walked into the hot ashes of an old brush fire, and began a series of remarks which banished all curiosity in that cranberry bog as an influence controlling behavior. In this experience the conflicting instincts of fear and curiosity were contending for control, until my forceful remarks on the subject of hot feet became the stimulus which gave fear the upper hand and resulted in a stampede.

As a man is more richly endowed than are other animals with innate tendencies, so he has many more conflicting dispositions, and a number of them may be called into play at the same time. When two instincts, whose appropriate actions are the opposite of each other, come into play at the same time, there is a deadlock, so far as

action is concerned, until one or the other disposition attains supremacy. As a Maine farmer philosopher once said, it is sometimes human nature to run, and sometimes human nature to fight. When conflicting instincts are called into play, they balance each other, until something, throwing its weight on one side or the other, determines which shall have the upper hand. In such conflicts intelligence is often the preponderating element. We decide into which stream to commit ourselves. In this way an instinct, whose action for some reason is undesirable, is suppressed by yielding ourselves to a rival instinct whose operations promise better results.

The third method of side-tracking a disposition is a corollary of the second. It is the case where the impulse, in its passage and before action, is held up in the forum of consciousness to be passed upon by intelligence. If the verdict of intelligence is against it, and self-respect has become organized as a master sentiment about a standard hostile to the particular impulse, it will be ostracized as an undesirable intruder. This is, however, but an example of conflicting dispositions.

I have tried to describe instincts in their operations from lower to higher forms of life, and to emphasize that the driving force behind human nature is not intelligence, logic, or any one cause,

but the innumerable and imperative impulses to action which are aroused when our various instincts and tendencies are stimulated. The problems of life are suggested by our dispositions. Intelligence solves them. It does this by adopting means to realize the ends suggested by dispositions, by discriminating between conflicting dispositions, or by building up an organized body of ideas to become incorporated as part of a disposition, which comes into play as a corrective factor to do battle with rival dispositions whose appropriate acts self-respect condemns.

You will find a list of instincts in any work on psychology. No two authors, however, agree on the same catalogue. Neither do psychologists agree in giving all credit to instincts in determining what we care about and work for. Some say instincts do it all. Others maintain that, in addition to the desires suggested by instincts, there are certain necessary desires which belong to the constitution of the mind, or, if you look at the physiology of it, to the way the brain centers work, quite apart from any hereditary connections. They put in this class the love of unity, order, rhythm, knowledge (curiosity), sociability, and to a certain extent the love of power or self-expression, and they claim that intellect plays quite a part in these desires. They would probably explain our interest in drill as partly the

native pleasure we take in rhythm, symmetry, and synchronous action. We do not, in these discussions, care whether curiosity, sociability, etc., are classed as instincts or necessary desires. We are concerned only with dispositions useful in military life, or which help us to understand human nature and the means by which it is controlled. We are seeking knowledge of the forces which underlie a soldier's nature, so that we can forecast and regulate his behavior.

IX

PUGNACITY, EMULATION, AND PLAY

I. PUGNACITY

FIGHTING is the normal and natural play or exercise of man. The English cockneys charging a German trench express an impulse of human nature, as they sing:—

“We beat you at the Marne,
We beat you at the Aisne,
We gave you hell
At Neuve Chapelle,
An’ ’ere we are again.”

Every boy reproduces in his growth this primeval instinct. They fight for the mere love of fighting. Mothers are often disturbed because “Johnny is fighting again.” The trouble with Johnny is that he is fighting the wrong thing or at the wrong time. The complaint is premature and unfair because Johnny must have an opportunity to develop and find himself before he can

become a real man. Every well-regulated American mother wishes her boy to become a brave and strong man to do battle against evil, although she may object to the first appearance of his fighting instinct before it is disciplined and its aggression is directed to worthy ends. After Johnny's pugnacity is properly trained every noble woman glories in his fighting strength and manhood when it is enlisted in a righteous cause. I maintain that the real objection raised to pugnacity is to its misuse, and that properly directed it must become a noble influence.

Pugnacity is an impulse to break down and destroy opposition. It finds satisfaction in annihilating an opponent. The impulse is accompanied by an emotional tone which is the internal aspect of this disposition as fighting is the external aspect. This emotion varies from rage to the mere joy in fighting. A characteristic of this tone, when anger predominates, is an abandon and freedom from prudential restraint. The singleness of purpose to destroy inhibits the working of other motives, and liberates all resources in the service of a ferocious and frenzied lust to slay, which finds its supreme expression in the fanaticism of the assault, which seizes troops imbued with a will to win when they rush forward with the bayonet.

Henry M. Stanley, the explorer, who was a

Confederate soldier, gives an account in his autobiography of his experience at the battle of Shiloh, where he felt himself swept forward, in the exultation of a fighting passion. He says:—

“After a steady exchange of musketry, which lasted some time, we heard the order, ‘Fix bayonets! On the double-quick!’ in tones that thrilled us. There was a simultaneous bound forward, each soul doing his best for the emergency. The Federals appeared inclined to await us; but at this juncture, our men raised a yell, thousands responded to it, and burst out into the wildest yelling it has ever been my lot to hear. It drove all sanity and order from among us. It served the double purpose of relieving pent-up feelings and transmitting encouragement along the attacking line. I rejoiced in the shouting like the rest. It reminded me that there were about four hundred companies like the Dixie Greys, who shared our feelings. Most of us, engrossed with the musket work, had forgotten the fact; but the wave after wave of human voices, louder than all other battle-sounds together, penetrated to every sense, and stimulated our energies to the utmost.

“‘They fly!’ was echoed from lip to lip. It accelerated our pace, and filled us with a noble rage. Then I knew what the Berserker passion was! It deluged us with rapture, and transfigured each Southerner into an exulting victor. At such

a moment, nothing could have halted us."

The most terrible enemies are men who fight not merely to gain a specific end, but because they love fighting. During one of the bloody battles on the Peninsula in our Civil War, General Kearney told a commander coming up with reinforcements, "Go in anywhere, there is lovely fighting along the whole front."

Our Anglo-Saxon forefathers were pugnacious in this sense and we at times revert to the ancestral type. Centuries of civilization have failed to eradicate this quality. It is liable to flame up in periods of excitement and make any disturbing cause the pretext for a fight. The fighting impulse is more likely to obsess undisciplined civilians than military men. Army men know enough about fighting to hold in and keep their heads. The best soldiers realize the difference between subordinated pugnacity and going around with a chip on the shoulder looking for trouble. Trained pugnacity does not spoil for a fight. The loyal officer knows how to work off his superfluous energy when there is no fighting going on, but when the country says fight, and he knows that fighting is right, then he "goes to it." As a rule politicians take more stock in opinions than they do in facts. If there is a noise which sounds like a popular obsession for war, the politicians furnish the jingo leaders. Every generation raises

its crop, but they are not recruited in this country from among army men.

A few years ago we went to war with Spain. Our excuse was to free Cuba, which could have been done and was in a fair way of being accomplished without a resort to arms. The blowing-up of the Maine stirred the fighting blood. From one end of the country to the other the dominant sentiment was:—

“Remember the Maine!
To Hell with Spain.”

Some glorified our purpose, and spoke of it as grasping the sword of justice and applying its exterminating edge to the last vestige of Spanish tyranny, denying free institutions in the New World. However they talked, their language meant, “To Hell with Spain.”

Military training controls and directs pugnacity into right channels and makes it subordinate to other purposes than the satisfaction of its own desire. Even the Prussian Junkers, who are supposed to show an over-development of this instinct, are not over-pugnacious because they are soldiers, but because the will to conquer is the dominant sentiment of the caste to which they belong. They subordinate pugnacity to the purpose of the group into which they are born.

The conditions that call anger into play are usually opposition to the free exercise of an impulse, or obstruction to the activities to which we are impelled by other instincts. Pugnacity thus becomes the means of reinforcing and helping other instincts to overcome opposition.

In the present European situation the impulse of Germany is to seek a place in the sun. This is a way of saying that a growing nation sees the rich places of the earth preëmpted or denied to her by other nations. The German instincts of acquisition, construction, and self-assertion are balked, and the fighting instinct is aroused to do battle in their service. The Allies had passed the early stage of land-grabbing, and were devoting their energies to developing a civilization each according to its lights. They saw their vested rights threatened by the aspirations of Germany, and were irresistibly swept into war by this opposition. Pugnacity in each case reinforced other natural impulses.

Pugnacity is the ally of all other impulses and taps the deepest sources of our reserve energy in the service of other instincts. To have fought a good fight is praise for saint or soldier. In the early years of Christian martyrdom when the Bishop of Cæsarea was led to the stake, legend says he heard a voice saying, "Play the man, Polycarp: play the man." Soldiers in all ages

have heard this voice. It is a call to the fighting instinct for aid.

Recent experiments, conducted by Professor Cannon in the Harvard Laboratory, in reference to the physiological changes caused by the emotions of rage and fear, illustrate how the instincts of pugnacity and fear liberate forces which increase bodily efficiency. It was found by experimentation that the emotional excitement which accompanies fear or anger stimulates the activities of the adrenal glands, and causes them to pour into the blood-stream an increased amount of secretion. This secretion has a remarkable effect upon the body. It drives the blood from the abdominal viscera into the heart, lungs, central nervous system, and the limbs. It acts as an antidote to muscular fatigue, and renders more rapid the coagulation of blood.

If a muscle is fatigued, its threshold of irritability rises. If the fatigued muscle is allowed to rest, the former irritability is gradually regained, though two hours may pass before the recovery is complete. If the adrenal glands are stimulated to secrete, the former irritability of the fatigued muscle may be recovered within three minutes. In this way it is found that adrenal secretion may postpone fatigue. Professor Cannon describes the effect and utility of the bodily changes caused by the stimulation of these glands as follows:—

"The clue which gives these responses significance is found in considering the conditions which would accompany fear or great anger. McDougall has pointed out the relation between these effective states and certain instincts. Thus, fear is associated with the instinct to run; anger with the instinct to fight. These emotions in wild life would be roused in the presence of prey or the enemy: a situation that would not unnaturally involve both the pursuer and the pursued in a desperate run or a fight. In case of combat pain would add to the stimulus of the emotion, and thus there might ensue a supreme and prolonged struggle. Under such circumstances the liberated sugar would be serviceable for the laboring muscles, for it is known to be the elective source of muscular energy. The adrenal secretion, by abolishing the effects of fatigue, would place the muscles unqualifiedly at the disposal of the nervous system. The shifting of the blood from the less insistent viscera of the abdomen to the organs of utmost value in critical physical struggle—the heart, lungs, limbs, and nervous system—would be of the greatest service in assuring efficient action of these organs. And if in the combat the vessels are injured, prompt clotting of the blood might help to prevent dangerous bleeding.

"The emotional reactions above described may

each be interpreted, therefore, as making the organism more efficient in the struggle which fear or rage may involve. And that organism which, with the aid of adrenal secretion, best mobilizes its sugar, lessens its muscular fatigue, sends its blood to the vitally important organs, and provides against serious hemorrhage, will stand the best chance of surviving in the struggle for existence."

This stimulation of the adrenal glands is nature's way of furnishing increased energy to the body when called upon to put forth greater exertion. The liberation of these forces when the instinct of pugnacity is called into play is felt as an increased elation and an impulse to greater activity. When these forces are released, however, by the instinct of fear, a sense of distress often accompanies the bodily changes which accompany this sudden and unexpected addition of energy. This distress may be so great as to inhibit action and produce panic.

Pugnacity is a fact in human nature. It is often in open rebellion against the higher life that the acquired wisdom of man prescribes. It does not find its sole satisfaction in throat-cutting. Its sphere is limited only by the activities of man. St. Paul was richly endowed with the fighting instinct. When we first hear of him he is in the full swing of its impulse, stoning Stephen and

otherwise maltreating believers. After his experience on the road to Damascus, the same old energy blazes in the service of a new ideal. His master motive is an annihilating war against the order of things he formerly supported.

Pugnacity has been the driving force in past ages behind civilization. Every civilization that has passed owes its extinction, in part at least, to the decay of a warlike spirit among its people. It is a common saying that civilization has gone forward with the powder cart. This means that the organization of life adapted to develop the fighting instinct of a people is also adapted to develop the growth of the forces which underlie civilization. It has been said:—

“When, in the development of man, social groups began to wage wars against each other, the success and survival of a group depended in a large degree upon their capacity for united action. This implies individual subordination to the ends of the group and to the commands of a leader. When such conflicts extended over long periods of time, there must have been developed, in the individuals of the surviving group, self-control, good-comradeship, personal trustworthiness, and fidelity to the group, which encased each member in a hard crust of custom, in which the interest of the group habitually dominated the egotistic tendencies of each member.”

In such groups citizens existed for the State and not the State for citizens. The identity of self was lost in that of the group. There must have developed in such groups a sensitive regard on the part of each for the opinion of his fellow, which, when standards of conduct were formulated, helped to make and keep all men alike, brave, enduring, and patriotic. This tendency was reinforced by religion, which developed the idea that sin, which was often a lapse from military virtue, justified an angry divinity in visiting his wrath upon a whole community unless it purged itself of the offender. If any Jonah appeared, he was promptly thrown to a whale. The Anglo-Saxons planted a coward in soft mud and raked him down with a harrow until he drowned.

Civilization has been developed and advanced by the very forces that would seem destined to destroy and blot it out. Blood-shed, struggle, and destruction have been the means by which humanity has been taught. Warfare has been and still is the great discipliner of nations. Fighting purges a people of self-seeking, love of ease, lust of possession, and fosters the great virtues, courage, endurance, hardihood, and patriotism. This is not because men kill one another, or by so doing satisfy a desire for destruction. The indiscriminate slaughters of Nero contributed nothing to his glory. The dying gladiator awak-

ens pity rather than admiration, because his suffering and endurance seem wasted for lack of a worthy cause.

The satisfaction in the play of pugnacity involves the completion of a whole process, and into that process has been incorporated, in the gradual development of social groups, the idea of loyalty and service to a cause, which involves the well-being of a smaller or larger group of which the actor is a member. By a process of evolution these ideas have become organized and incorporated with pugnacity into a system, the dominant passion of which is a militant desire to satisfy the primary fighting impulse as modified by the infusion of these ideas. Whenever modern men have been ennobled by warfare, they have believed that they were fighting against an evil or defending something of value. It is the discernment of a cause and disciplined service in a cause which makes the difference.

In the development of a child or of a race, the fighting instinct antedates the appearance of the social impulse. The army spirit is a phase of the social disposition. It dominates and controls individuals and subordinates their pugnacity to the purpose of the group—whatever the purpose. It receives a tremendous forward push by enlisting in its service the will to win. The Prince of Peace said to his followers, when sending them

to do battle with the forces of evil, "Let him that hath no sword, sell his garment and buy one." He used the word "sword" in a symbolic sense, meaning the military virtues—courage, energy, endurance, perseverance, and the will to conquer—qualities which enabled his lieutenant to say, toward the end of a great life, "I have fought the good fight." Without these qualities religion is flabby and sentimental; with them it is a battle; even so, victory only comes at the end of a fight.

The utility of a pugnacious instinct among soldiers needs no comment. Among a warlike people its growth is encouraged. This is done by making the military virtues—self-sacrifice, courage, endurance, and fidelity—the objects of honor and praise in legend and song. The images of heroes are exalted in enduring monuments and public works are dedicated to the memory of their valor. Art, literature, and religion unite to crown the successful warrior with distinction. These are the means used to create standards, to serve as models for imitation, and to develop a love of a correct military type.

The organization of our emotions with ideas, in systems which react to the images or symbols which excite them, is illustrated in the cult which underlies our various practices of honoring the flag. They are intended to awaken martial feel-

ings and a willingness to give personal service as a share in a common contribution for the protection of common rights. It is a combination of the instinct of pugnacity with the idea of loyalty.

There is a story which comes from days when believers gathered to battle against the heathen. A holy maid wrought a banner. For the first color she chose the red badge of courage; for the second, the blue of Heaven; and with the symbol of purity she united the red and blue, the earthly and the divine, making them the red, white, and blue. Upon a field of white samite edged with blue, she wrought, in letters of beating crimson, the words, "Fear God, Honour the King, and Love the Brotherhood." Since then, whatever legend the flag of the red, white, and blue bears, we understand it to mean the same,—Respect for the Eternal Laws of God, Loyalty to Country, and Service for Humanity.

The habitual readiness to perform the acts demanded by the standards is developed by linking these acts with ideas of duty. It was said of an old Puritan that he carried a gun in the woods, not because he was afraid, but because he wished to be prepared to do God's will in case he met an Indian. Pugnacity in the service of such an ideal is capable of the noblest exertions. I have often heard Major Higginson intimate that it is great fun to be a soldier in a just cause. Love of fight-

ing and fighting for love is a combination which has often appealed to the Anglo-Saxon and is desirable for military efficiency.

I am sometimes asked if we need to develop pugnacity, and whether or not every man has enough of it if it were rightly directed. Pugnacity is the blessed inheritance of the Anglo-Saxon. To be a blessing, however, it must be subordinated. Running wild without cultivation, training, or control, it is a nuisance to orderly living. It must be chained and linked to loyalty for everyday use. We all know that the sex instinct, properly regulated, is the basis of family life and can be subordinated to the needs and progress of society. Uncontrolled, it threatens civilization. In the same way pugnacity, harnessed to the service of a cause, furnishes the driving force of achievements. Military training, like religious training, subordinates and utilizes this instinct to put "pep" into action. Spiritual truths to attain full life need the aid of pugnacity as their generous ally.

A Sir Galahad is possible. There are common elements in saint and knight, which are rooted in human nature. These are the energy and abandonment of pugnacity and the restraint of subordination. The word pugnacity has become odious, because the fighting instinct is the slave of other passions, and we too often associate it with the

activities of a cruel nature. To most people the word pugnacity is hateful. It suggests a small and quarrelsome nature looking for personal offense. Words get a character which you cannot change any more than you can change the character of a person. The fighting instinct is the slave of other passions and we often associate it with the activities of a cruel nature. The pugnacity of Tennyson's King Arthur seems a different thing from the pugnacity of a Vandal or Goth, because its energy is used in the service of such a different master. The driving force of pugnacity is a vessel of honor or dishonor, according as it allies itself with good or evil. The Church has often retold the tale of the pagan Frank, who upon hearing for the first time the story of Calvary, grasped his sword and proclaimed, "If I and my thanes had been there, there would have been no crucifixion on that day." As the ally of righteousness, the energy of pugnacity is a noble gift.

I do not wish you to infer from what I have said that I glorify pugnacity and war. I have tried to emphasize the utility of cultivating pugnacity as a preparation for success in war.

I understand the horrors of war, and that it is a welter of hate, passion, cruelty, suffering, and waste: yet I realize that in this welter was laid the foundation of many high virtues. The connec-

tion between war and the great moral qualities is forcibly expressed by John Ruskin in a lecture delivered to young soldiers at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich:—

“The common notion that peace and the virtues of civil life flourished together, I found to be utterly untenable. Peace and the vices of civil life only flourish together. We talk of peace and learning, of peace and plenty, of peace and civilization; but I found that these are not the words that the Muse of History coupled together; that on her lips the words were, peace and sensuality, peace and selfishness, peace and death. I found, in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; that they were nourished in war and wasted in peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace; in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace.”

What I glorify is, loyalty, courage, self-sacrifice, and the manly virtues which have been developed by war. I do not indiscriminately praise all kinds of war, but I do extol the disciplined and aggressive battle against evil, or in defense of whatever is noblest and pure and the human up-lift which comes as the result of such war.

Some minds are so preëmpted with the images of the horrors of war that they fail to recognize the facts expressed in the saying, “Civilization

has gone forward with the powder cart." The level-headed see both sides of the shield, and are seeking to find "the moral equivalent of war."

II. EMULATION

Emulation seems to be a child of pugnacity. It is a kind of play fighting, and runs parallel with and is closely associated with the fighting instinct. People of unwarlike races are relatively free from it. To them such games as football are absurd. It seems to them unnatural to put forth vigor in a contest where the prize is nothing but the satisfaction of winning.

Pugnacity finds its satisfaction in the destruction of its opponent, while emulation is content with his submission.

In "Rob Roy" we have a picture of the play of these two tendencies in two Scotch communities separated by a few miles. In the Highlands the MacGregor and his gillies represent an intensively pugnacious type: among them the claymore and dagger are always red in the business of destruction. In Glasgow, on the other hand, Mr. Jarvie and his kind accumulate "siller" in trade, or wage a war of words in the council of magistrates, where the only objects of destruction are reputations. To Rob Roy this town business is tame and unworthy of manhood.

Professor James says that nine-tenths of the work of the world is accomplished by emulation. It is the principal motive in all our games, in commercial and industrial rivalries after a competence is assured, in our system of education, and in nearly all our intellectual and business activities. The consciousness of being superior even in dress is said to bring a kind of consolation to some which religion cannot give.

Emulation has supplanted pugnacity as a driving force in most affairs of life except in war and religion.

Emulation has certain values for war. It stimulates enthusiasm in drill or maneuvers. In actual battles it is the source of wholesome rivalry between allies. But emulation cannot supplant pugnacity.

The object of war is the total annihilation of the organized forces of the enemy in the shortest time. As destruction is the satisfier of pugnacity, and the end toward which it directs its energies, augmenting other impulses with one driving force, it is the paramount instinct to be cultivated for success in war.

III. PLAY

There is a tendency to certain kinds of play in youth which has been explained as a preparation

for the activities of maturer years. Young dogs engage in playful fighting under conditions which imply an understanding that no injury will be done. Some part of the fighting instinct is aroused, which trains brain and muscles in ways that are later useful in real combat. Young boys react in this way in their hunting and fighting games, and in the same way some part of the maternal instinct reacts in the doll-playing and housekeeping games of girls. Many games of this kind are attempts to gain the excitement of certain instincts by feigning that the occasion for their exercise is present. In military games, like maneuvers and field exercises, the tendencies involved are hunting, fighting, and emulation. If maneuvers were properly prepared and planned and the rules governing the game selected to develop the situations which satisfy the instinctive tendencies, they would become strong inducements to encourage soldierly training. An organization would naturally look forward to a maneuver period as the culmination of the year's work, and prepare for it with the keenest interest. The tendency to indulge in play fighting has a capacity for military usefulness which is capable of great development in the way of dramatizing war, teaching actions useful in field service, and organizing military experience by the solution of problems. The object of maneuvers is to exercise soldiers in what

they would have to do in war, and by practice to create in them the valor that comes from confidence. It is an ancient method of teaching tactics, the success of which depends upon its accuracy in reproducing service conditions. I once read how a Roman commander whose troops were forced back by a charge of elephants, which was a new mode of fighting to his soldiers, blamed himself for not preparing his men to meet elephants by appropriate play exercises. He caused elephants to be brought into his camp, to familiarize his men with these animals, to make them acquainted with their strength and courage, and to instruct them where to strike. He made his cavalry engage them with blunted arrows in order to accustom the horses to their cries, their smell, and to the sight of their unyielding hulks. This story illustrates the correct principle which should underlie all maneuvers. They should be games to make soldiers familiar with the means of overcoming the difficulties of combat and campaigning.

X

SELF-ASSERTION AND SELF-ABASEMENT

THESE instincts are conflicting tendencies which have much to do with discipline and soldier-making. In its primary form, self-assertion is the instinct of self-display. We see it in the struttings of the peacock and in the exhibition displays of other animals. Among men it finds satisfaction in an admiring gaze, and is brought into play by the presence of spectators. We do not wear our best clothes when there is no one to see us.

This peacock instinct is useful in military training, and opportunities should be given for its legitimate display in ceremonies and exhibitions before a crowd. Advantage can be taken of the pleasure the soldier feels in display to secure precise and soldierly execution. I have seen at West Point, during an evening parade, the long line of gray and white break into column and swing past in review. Eight hundred peacocks on parade, if you please, yet the impression is one of solidarity and worth. One feels that there is passing a

pageant of martial virility in its making.

The instinct of display is the basic element in the sentiment of pride. Pride in dress and external trappings is not in itself a high ideal, but is of infinite importance as a stage in developing a sense of personal dignity and worth. Like cleanliness it shows a respect for the body as the dwelling-place of our moral nature. The way a man carries, handles, and dresses his person is evidence of a self-valuation, and is expressed in an adage of some military value: if you don't respect yourself, no one else will. For a soldier to be well dressed, to be clean and neat in his belongings, and to handle his business with promptness and precision is an expression of pride and an affirmation to the world of a superiority, which the world often accepts at its face valuation.

As self-assertion is a desire to give a lead, its balancing instinct, self-abasement, is a willingness to accept a lead. In the animal world the physiological expression of self-abasement is a slinking and crestfallen behavior, accompanied by a general feeling of subserviency and diminution of muscular tone. I suppose each of us at some time has felt disgrace in the ownership of a pup, who, upon the approach of an imposing strange dog, tucked tail between legs, lowered head, and crawled with legs so bent that his belly almost scraped the ground. Such gross bodily

cringing and inner subserviency have no military value. It is the less extreme form of self-abasement, submission and willingness to accept a lead, which are of military importance.

Military education does not attempt a compromise between these two conflicting tendencies, but to unite them in an imperfect fusion in which the spirit of self-assertion persists, although the predominating tone is one of subordination. This capacity of fusing inconsistent tendencies is an asset of an Anglo-Saxon inheritance. Each Saxon thane was master of himself, upon his own land and in his own hut. He was earnest, active, daring, firm, self-contained, and reliant in all the activities of life. To him the world was a fighting arena and heroism the highest excellence. If his chief received anything from him, it was because he gave it willingly. He did, however, accept a superior war lord, and was capable of devotion, respect, and self-denial. Having chosen a chief, he placed his head and hands upon that chieftain's knees in token of a plighted faith, and held it infamous, ever after, not to serve as a steadfast and faithful follower, abounding in courage and ever ready for self-sacrifice, even to death. He forgot himself in his leader, assigned to that leader all glory, and served him with love and devotion.

To be a cog in a wheel, to glory in that fact,

and to be as independent a cog as the game of the wheel permits, is the Anglo-Saxon type of self-abasement. In this form the instinct of self-abasement is one of the basic elements of discipline.

To those who impress us by their superiority, we naturally assume an attitude of suggestibility, and readily accept their ideas. We see examples of this in daily life. Sometimes last winter, Mr. Walter H. Trumbull, Captain of the Harvard Football Eleven, talked to some boys in a settlement class on football. Some of them in after conversation expressed a wish for him as a coach. They were asked if they would do what he told them, to which all replied with a universal "SURE." There was no doubt about their willingness to obey. They even felt glorified by the suggestion of serving under such leadership. This is an example of the effect of prestige in calling into play the instinct of subordination. Under similar circumstances one accepts a lead, and obeys as naturally as one eats when hungry, or sleeps when tired. There is within us an impulse to obey which is called out by contact with a personality whose superiority, compared with our own, seems boundless. It makes discipline easy. One drops into the habit of obeying as naturally as one acquires other habits by yielding to instinctive impulses.

This superiority which impresses us may be physical, moral, or mental. It may be ability to punish or reward, the force of opinion, or the mysterious power which we call prestige.

Military theory recognizes nature, and clothes leadership with authority, distance, and various trappings and privileges which suggest prestige. The qualities in an officer of dignity, composure, impartiality, leadership, and justice are set off by distance, which holds respect, and enables an officer, no matter how severe in exercising command, to obtain the admiration of his men. Officers are kept apart from men, not because they are more precious, but because a perspective is often necessary to give the necessary prestige. Too close an intimacy magnifies our common failings, and a little distance is necessary to permit imagination to gloss over the inequalities of human nature. The close insistence upon the many rules of military courtesy is not so much due to a desire to uphold the rules of conduct which prevail among cultivated men as to give prestige to the rank of officers, an artificial prestige. There is an element in prestige which has its base in a universal consent to the necessary order involved in organization. There must be a head and there naturally attaches to this office an idea of authority. This prestige is heightened by a deference to rank and by privileges which are neces-

sary or contribute to the exercise of command. This artificial prestige is helpful and should be encouraged.

General Scott spoke of the rules of civility, etiquette, and courtesy as the indispensable outworks of subordination. He meant that the observance of the rules of military courtesy is the means to and the test of subordination. Rank in itself is also a symbol of Nationality. The officer as a thing, by virtue of his commission, represents the National in the same sense that the flag stands for National Ideals. Deference to superiority is not a meaningless performance. It shows a mastery of self in the service of a cause. A man does not become a soldier until he salutes with pride.

A lawyer friend told me that "the business of military saluting gets my goat." Yet the same lawyer in the courtroom shows the greatest deference to judges, and is most correct in deportment toward the bench. I suppose his legal ruminant has been educated, and he does not think of his performances as acts of subordination or as intended to confer upon judges an artificial prestige.

Military courtesy not only shows subordination in ourselves, but also encourages it in others. It helps create a sentiment in favor of discipline. It is easy to act and feel with a crowd. The cor-

rect attitude toward seniority suggests imitation, and if the superior officer has real prestige, deference to his opinions and commands is but the natural expression of our natures.

There will be in every command men who are only subordinate when that instinct is called into play by physical force or the ability to inflict punishment. Like a primitive people, they exercise self-restraint only under the pressure of brute force. They resemble the Mexican peons of whom I recently read in a life of President Diaz. "In a lonely part of the South, trains had been robbed by the inhabitants of a certain village. The President told an officer to take his company, and put an end to that sort of thing. The officer had every house searched: almost all contained stolen property. He then marshaled the villagers, picked out every fortieth man, and had him shot. After this he said, 'I am taking my troops away, but if any more train robberies take place, we will come back and shoot every twentieth man. Should it be necessary to return again, every tenth man will be executed.' " No more trains were attacked.

The certainty of prompt and severe punishment for cowardice is always a powerful stimulus to hold in play the instinct of subordination, and has always been practiced by very warlike people. It is said that at one time the Romans picked by lot

and executed every tenth man in a legion that had shown the white feather. We have heard of the Anglo-Saxon custom of raking cowards into mud under a harrow.

At the same time it must be remembered that soldiers are not so much driven by force or fear as they are led by the power of commanding. To be an officer, a man must have by nature or acquire in some way this quality which dominates and compels obedience in others. Whether a born leader or not, he must impress his followers with power superior to their own, appear master of the situation, his faith in himself and undertaking be boundless, his intelligence overreach that of his followers, and he must stir their imagination and infuse them with his hope and courage. When overpowered by these feelings, men are ready to follow a lead.

Military theory places at the head of organization men presumably of superior experience, courage, and enthusiasm. The ordinary officer is not a born leader, but must build up his own prestige by hard work. He must acquire knowledge of his profession and above all the force of character, which accepts responsibility and leads to decision and determination. Prestige is partly science, but mostly character. Military character-building is not so much a matter of imparting knowledge as of developing the right emotional tones and in-

spiring the will to do. The impulses to act come from the will and feelings, and not from the understanding. The purpose of military education is to acquaint the future officer with the type of officer efficient in war, and to stimulate within him a love of that type which will burn like a passion to fulfill itself by making him what he thinks he ought to be. After that it is the efforts he makes to assimilate and make the type his own that count.

We often hear it said that the captain makes the company. If he is neat, smart, precise, and prompt, his qualities standardize and stimulate the men. He does infinitely more. The noblest traditions of life must be absorbed by most of us under the influence of personalities in whom they have been strongly embodied. It is the responsibility of the officer to create the atmosphere in the soldier's life, suggesting ideals of duty, a love of the service, and loyalty to the organization and its purposes.

The real prestige of a company officer which makes him respected and obeyed throughout his command, is the faith which his men have in his direction and control. To inspire this faith he must be master of himself, of the situation, and of his men. Self-mastery need not extend to all temptations, but must be proof against all abhorrent military vices. An officer must have courage,

interest, application, subordination, faith in himself, decision, and a willingness to accept responsibility. He must look his part and carry himself as an officer. Enlisted men are not over-critical about what they consider non-essential. They cannot and will not follow a coward and are fussy about the kinds of self-indulgence they condemn. They have scruples about the conduct of their officers which should be respected.

To appear master of a situation, an officer must approach the solution of its problems with the air of confidence and certainty. Behind this appearance must be the knowledge and experience to make good. When called upon to train men from civil life, the daily routine of camp will be a series of petty problems. You must know the answers to each. You must be the first to discover what is amiss, and it must be remedied under your direction. The oversight of the company officers should be ubiquitous to make its control felt in the every detail of life in such a way as to create confidence in his leadership. Throughout the whole course of training the superiority of the officer must be apparent. He must know what he teaches and teach with authority. All his decisions must be right. The constant contact and control within the company establishes the officer's character and sound judgment and his right to command. When it comes

to the business of fighting if the officer has hitherto led well, has inspired the company with an idea of his superiority, the men will trust his leadership to take them through.

The company is our survival of the clan. The captain is the father whose duty it is to organize and weld it into an organization imbued with the strength of fellowship. The men should feel, think, and will alike about their duties, be loyal and helpful to each other, and aggressive against the enemy. Such organizing demands in its leader the element of human affection, a real interest in men, a spirit of justice, and a will to identify himself with the hopes and fortunes of the company. The company commander creates the conditions upon which military success depends. These conditions have been described by Professor McDougall as follows:—

“Success in combat depends not only upon the vigor, courage, and ferocity of the individual fighters, but also upon the capacity of the individuals for united action, upon good-comradeship, upon personal trustworthiness, and upon the capacity of the individuals to subordinate their impulses, tendencies, and egotistic promptings to the ends of the group and to the commands of the accepted leader. Success implies a definite organization, recognition of a leader, faithful observance of his commands, and a training and prac-

tice which bind men together, making them do the same thing, teaching them what to expect of each other, fashioning them alike, and keeping them so."

The basic element in prestige is the power of mastery. The following analysis may be helpful:

Self-mastery	Courage
	Dignity
	Composure
	Correct deportment
	Interest
	Faith in one's efforts
	Decision
	Willingness to accept responsibility
Mastery of Situation	Knowledge
	Organized experience
Mastery of Men	Impartial justice
	Certainty of purpose
	Constant control
	Fellowship in danger
	Human interest in men as comrades
	Power of inspiring con- fidence in others

I was long connected with the militia before I learned what an officer should be. No one told

me. The knowledge grew out of experience. I was surprised to discover that the qualifications for an officer which I have described, stimulate and compel obedience in others. There was an uncanny mastery about the power of qualified leadership. It seemed too mechanical to be true. It is true, however, and it is as practical as it is true. I found at West Point an educational institution founded upon the fact that a period of intensive training can turn out officers qualified to organize and train men as soldiers, and to act as leaders for small organizations. The Military Academy does not profess to do more. If its graduates become high ranking officers they have only to thank the Academy for a correct elementary foundation. I also learned that much time in the four years course was devoted to matters of general education. If the right military atmosphere can be created, competent instructors secured, and a proper system of instruction inaugurated, I do not see why the larger American colleges cannot create a West Point course as part of their curriculum. I feel certain that a school like this throbbing with military zeal can instill in your minds correct visions of what an officer should be, and that the high standards that are taught here are practical and well within your power of absorption. It is given to every one of you to serve the republic with honor.

When you think of yourselves as officers, think of the qualities of character which become an officer and insure his right to command, and resolve to make all these qualities your own personal possessions.

The power of prestige is subtle in its operation. I have been interested in studying Sheridan's ride with a view to analyzing the suggestion of a commander which turned a rout into victory. General Sheridan was a great commander: he had the confidence of men, and in handling them his own conduct repeatedly suggested to his followers the action expected of them. In the fall of 1864, while operating in the Shenandoah Valley, he was called to Washington to confer with the Chief of Staff of the Army, and on his return to the Valley spent a night at Winchester, some nineteen miles north of Cedar Creek, where his army was encamped. The next morning he started to join the army; a few miles from Winchester he encountered evidences of a panic. He then began his celebrated ride which is described by General George A. Forsyth, who accompanied him as aide:

"Within the next few miles the pike and adjacent fields began to be lined and dotted everywhere with army wagons, sutlers, outfits, headquarters supply trains, disabled caissons, and teamsters with led mules, all drifting to the rear;

now and then a wounded officer, or enlisted man on horseback, or plodding along on foot with groups of straggling soldiers here and there along the wagon trains, or in the field, or sometimes sitting or lying down to rest beside the road, while others were making coffee in their tin cups by tiny camp-fires. Soon we began to see small bodies of soldiers in the fields with stacked arms, evidently cooking breakfast. As we debouched into the fields and around the wagons, the General waved his hat to the men and pointed to the front, never lessening his speed; it was enough; one glance at the eager face and familiar black horse, and they knew him, and starting to their feet, they swung their caps around their heads, and broke into cheers as he passed beyond them, and then gathering up their belongings and shouldering their arms, they started after him for the front, shouting to their comrades further out in the field, 'Sheridan! Sheridan!' waving their hats and pointing after him as he dashed onward; and they, too, comprehended instantly, for they took up the cheering and turned back for the battlefield. To the best of my recollection, from the time we met the first stragglers who were drifting back from the army, his appearance and his cheery shout of 'Turn back, men, turn back! Face the other way,' as he waved his hat toward the front, had but one result: a wild cheer of recognition and an answer-

ing wave of the cap. In no case as I glanced back did I fail to see the men shoulder their arms and follow us. I think it is no exaggeration to say that as he pushed on to the field of battle, for miles back the turnpike was lined with men pressing after him to the front.

"After the whole line was thoroughly formed, I rode over to my chief, and urged him to ride down it, that all the men might see him and know without doubt that he had returned and assumed command. At first he demurred, but I was most urgent, as I knew that in some instances both men and officers, who had not seen him, doubted his arrival. His appearance was greeted by tremendous cheers from one end of the line to the other, many of the officers pressing forward to shake his hand. He spoke to them all cheerily and confidently, saying, 'We are going back to our camps, men, never fear. I will get a twist on these people yet. We will raise them out of their boots before the day is over.'"

I sat with General Forsyth before an open fire one winter afternoon, discussing Sheridan's ride and its influence upon turning men back to the fighting line. As the result of this talk, I was convinced that few heard Sheridan's words, "Turn back! Face the other way!" Many, however, saw him hurrying to the front. There was, in the swift-moving picture of the black horse and

rider, a powerful suggestion which gripped men in the vise of a new energy and a will to conquer.

Our suggestibility depends upon the volume and duration of the suggestion, and upon our ignorance, lack of convictions, and experience in reference to the topic suggested, and also in a large measure upon the character of the source from which suggestions come. We are all familiar with the beliefs induced in school-children, because "Teacher said so."

Suggestion and imitation are different phases of the same thing, suggestion being the cause, and imitation the effect. Some writers believe that there is a general instinct of imitation. I have never felt such a general call to imitate indiscriminately all I see. I remember a winter visit with a friend at a lumber camp, where a native was moved to present my friend with a small bone from a deer's leg, which, he said, he and his father had used for many years, and found it to be a most durable and useful toothpick. Although we were shown how to operate this instrument as a toothpick, and title was passed upon the assumption that this use would continue, I do not recall that the suggestion bore fruit or the family practice was imitated by my friend.

Although there is no general tendency to imitate all actions seen, there is a tendency to imitate certain actions under some circumstances and to

catch the emotional tone that accompanies these actions. This may be true in any case, as we have seen where the instinct of subordination is excited and we adopt some action as a model. There are a few cases which seem to support the theory of a general instinct of imitation. If one animal in a herd is startled and runs, uttering some characteristic cry of fear, his actions seem to induce, not only flight, but fear throughout the herd. Gregarious animals do act and feel together when frightened. Human beings respond in much the same way to some of the emotions of their fellow men. We may be panic-stricken at the sight or sounds of terror in others when we do not know the cause. In times of excitement there are particular actions and expressions, the perception of which in others produces like conduct and feeling in the witnesses. We have a tendency to yell when others yell, to look at what others observe, to run with others or to get away from the focus from which others scatter: also a tendency to chase, attack, and rend what others hunt and seize.

The feature of military interest in such happenings is the recognition of the tendency to imitate and to follow the lead of a coward or a brave man. Imitation has an affinity for courage and fear. The old Saxons probably recognized this tendency to imitate cowards and provided against it in their mud-bath and harrow. I have heard

of a general who, in one of the Balkan battles, excused his recruits from taking part in an engagement, because he was afraid of their example upon his seasoned troops.

The explanation of this kind of imitation is biological. Probably in the ages before we were men, our ancestors found it useful to pay attention to their fellows when they uttered some characteristic cry of alarm. It favored survival for some animals to pay this sort of attention and to run away at the first intimation of danger. Among gregarious animals the perception that one of their kind is frightened operates as a suggestion and is a stimulus to excite their own fear. This explains human panics. There are multitudes of sights and sounds in battle, apart from the behavior of one's fellows, which stimulate the instinct of fear. The mere shock of the changes taking place in the body, together with the images of death or mutilation suggested by the surroundings, have a tendency to paralyze the critical faculties and to create an attitude of extreme susceptibility. Disaster seems about to overwhelm. The behavior of each of our comrades is a suggestion, powerfully affecting our own actions. Every man showing fear suggests fear to others, and increases the volume of the fear suggestion in the air. People act and react upon each other, until, by repetition, the volume of the suggestion

fills every mind with fear and all organization and control are lost in a panic-stricken mob. In the same way courage is contagious. If comrades seem endowed with a determination to conquer, show it in their conduct, and take the lead, the perception of this spirit by others suggests like conduct on their part, and draws them on, until, by repetition and volume, the suggestion of courage dominates all and inhibits fear.

Victory is not so much a matter of killing men as of frightening the survivors, and making each of them, by his example, stimulate more terror among his comrades, until the mass is demoralized and incapable of further resistance.

The will to power is a form of self-assertion which has lately come in for a large share of condemnation. We associate this instinct in our blame with a spirit of aggression which competes with a rival to despoil him of possessions or of freedom. There is a kind of competition, however, in which the will to win injures no man. A soldier may will to be the best shot, the best-drilled, the strongest, the smartest, the neatest, the promptest, the most loyal, or the most useful in the command. His strivings to fulfill these purposes interfere with the possessions and freedom of no man. Every man in the organization can will and strive for the highest excellence in the same field. There is no harmful competition.

In the early days of the first French Republic, when all Europe had united in arms against her, a young man willed to be the first soldier of France. He enlisted in the Forty-fifth Regiment of the line, a noble by birth, a private in the ranks. Among the bravest soldiers he was esteemed the first: he never attained a higher grade or was known by any other title than the First Grenadier of France. Foremost at every post of danger, the volunteer in every emergency of more than ordinary peril, he refused every proffer of advancement and lived among his comrades the hard life of a soldier. He fell near Newbourg, bearing the tri-color of the Republic. To-day at parade muster, when the roll is called in his old regiment, the name Latour d'Auvergne is first upon the list. No answer comes from him, now dead more than a century, and as his name is called a second time, the senior sergeant makes answer, "Dead upon the field of honor." D'Auvergne's will to power robbed no one. It enriched his comrades and a century of soldiers with a fuller vision of service and devotion.

By your presence in this School you will to be soldiers. Go the limit and will to be the best!

The will to win, like pugnacity, may be associated with base ends, or it may become the generous ally of a great cause. These two instincts are often found in play together. Allied they are

springs of tremendous energy. Whether acting for good or evil, they generate great forces which control conduct and make history.

We have seen that subordination is necessary for discipline, but the subordination required in military training is a mild form of self-abasement compared with the abject submission evidenced by the slinking and crestfallen pup in the presence of an imposing strange dog. We have no use for such subserviency. In military life, self-abasement takes the form of subordination to the purpose of the group. When it goes farther, it is anti-military.

The difference between the pacifist and militarist is fundamentally a difference of instincts. Whether we are one or the other at any time depends upon the result of a conflict between rival instincts. While the instinct of self-abasement dominates, we are for peace at any price. In a contest on one side between the instincts which find their highest satisfaction in personal security and enjoyment and the instincts which find satisfaction in defending and caring for the group, we are pacifists or militarists according as the first or second rival group dominates. We may change from time to time, or become permanent in either fold.

During a long peace, when the nation makes few demands upon citizens for service, the per-

sonal instincts develop in great freedom. The citizens gratify them by acquiring properties, building up business and families, and indulging in the soft pleasures of life. The instincts grow as they are fed. Rival instincts that have no in-nings atrophy. Safety for self and personal belongings become first desires. The old Calvinist who prayed, "God bless me, my wife, my son John and his wife, us four and no more," probably hated war and service for a larger group than his prayer indicated. The safety and freedom of the smaller groups depend upon the safety and freedom of the large group, which is the Nation. The safety of the State should be logically the first desire of its citizens, because that lost, the foundation of personal freedom is endangered. We all acclaim "safety first." In doing this we may mean either the safety of our little selves or the safety of the greater unity of which we are a part—the Nation. Our attitude depends upon which instincts have the upper hand. If pugnacity, self-assertion, subordination to the group, and the social desires dominate, we are not pacifists in the hour of national danger. Against a strong and aggressive enemy, every nation fails when its people cease to be moved and controlled by these great instincts.

XI

GREGARIOUSNESS AND FEAR

I. GREGARIOUSNESS

THE explanation of human behavior is not simple, because man is so richly endowed with original tendencies and acquires so many others that it is difficult to analyze any situation, and say how many and what the tendencies are which have united to cause it. We have seen that the instincts of pugnacity and self-assertion are called into play to aid or reinforce some other instinct, and that the idea of loyalty is developed in a union of the various instincts when men get together for the common purpose of defense.

The social desire is common in men and animals. We are familiar with the fact that among animals that herd, if one becomes separated from the rest he displays distress until he finds and rejoins his mates. We see evidence of something like this instinct among men. With few exceptions the one essential condition of recreation seems to be being one of a crowd. The Harvard

and Yale football games exert great fascination, because all who attend are concerned with the same object and are moved by a common emotion. Our emotions are intensified and their enjoyment increased by sharing them with our fellows. Professor James says that the love of festivities, ceremonies, ordeals, etc., is universal:

“The lower savages have their dances, more or less formally conducted. The various religions have their solemn rites and exercises, and civic and military power symbolize their grandeur by processions and celebrations of diverse sorts. We have our operas and parties and masquerades. An element common to all these ceremonial games, as they may be called, is the excitement of concerted action as one of an organized crowd. The same acts performed with a crowd seem to mean vastly more than when performed alone. A walk with the people on a holiday afternoon, an excursion to drink beer or coffee at a popular resort, or an ordinary ballroom, are examples of this. Not only are we amused at seeing so many strangers, but there is a distinct stimulation at feeling our share in their collective life. The perception of them is the stimulus; and our reaction upon it is our tendency to join them and do what they are doing, and our unwillingness to be the first to leave off and go home alone. This seems a primitive element in our nature; it is difficult to

trace any association of ideas that could lead up to it; although, once granting it to exist, it is very easy to see what its uses to a tribe might be in facilitating prompt and vigorous collective action. The formation of armies and the undertaking of military expeditions would be among its fruits."

This desire is the basic cause of all military ceremonies. Soldiers feel a satisfaction in performing together, especially where each is conscious of the presence of his comrades, all uniting their individual efforts to perfect the work of the organization. A single exhibition well performed draws all members into a sense of unity with their kind, and into a recognition of the organization as a unity to be served, and whose cause each is attempting to advance.

A little boy said to his mother, "Why do military bands and soldiers marching always make me feel better than I am?" The boy was speaking of an emotion which is primary and irreducible. I love to march behind the Eighth Regiment Drum Corps; the cadence of marching feet, the rattle of changing arms, and even the rhythmic swish of clothing, together with the consciousness that I am performing and enjoying with others, make me feel as the little boy felt, that I am better than I am. Unlike the little boy, however, I do not ask questions, but try to look a modest hero and enjoy myself. On the intellec-

tual side I recognize the value of such emotions, that they make for solidarity and create a sense of comradeship and sympathy for my kind.

Religious rites are intended to create this sense of comradeship among worshipers and to promote some form of communion with God. Most of our military ceremonies have a religious origin. Guard-mounting was originally a ceremony of consecration, which has come to us from the days of the Crusades. All military ceremonies preserve this emotional tone, which they derive from their ecclesiastical origin, and still utilize it to create a sense of solidarity and good-comradeship.

II. FEAR

The word "fear" as used in common speech has a variety of meanings. It expresses forms of behavior, dislikes, and unpleasant expectations. It is usually employed in this latter sense, when we speak of the discipline of fear. We often hear that in the old Prussian system the fear of punishment was the chief motive by which soldiers were reduced to machines to be animated only by the voice of their officers, and that fear compelled them to submit to training, and was a prominent motive driving them forward in battle. The underlying principle of this kind of discipline was, that no man obeys when there is no power able

to overawe or to hurt him. I do not consider that there is in this method of discipline, however, any appeal to the instinct of fear. I recently stood at the intersection of two streets to watch the passing of a parade. As the leading band approached, a policeman came along and pushed me and the rest of the crowd back a few paces. I stepped back, not because I was afraid of the policeman, but because I recognized that behind him was the physical force which could and would compel me to move back if I did not obey him. I recognized in him the superior and inflexible power of the State which it was foolish to stand against. I had no desire to oppose him. My only impulse was to accept conditions, and to submit. The man next to me, in his desire to see, edged forward a little, but a peremptory order from the policeman was sufficient to awaken in him a willingness to obey. My motive in obeying the policeman was not fear. I probably had a vivid mind-picture of what he would do to me if I did not obey him, and rather than submit to unpleasant consequences I stepped back. This was nothing but hasty calculation and a quick decision that one result was preferable to another.

The old Prussian method was limited to training men in the expert use of arms, precise drill, and obedience; other mental or moral training which the soldiers received were by-products.

The dominant feature of the system was a quick resort to physical force as a restraining influence, and this force was freely exercised by the officers. In the atmosphere of this authority, the soldier felt that submission was somehow a part of the game. Without any special fear of the consequences of disobedience, he recognized that it was more comfortable for him to play the game as he was told. He became sufficiently well organized to exercise the necessary self-control and to conform to the requirements of the life around him; if not, the exercise of power was sufficient to make him assume the attitude of subordination. Behind authority was always brute force. Its presence may at times have appealed to the instinct of fear, but usually the indirect suggestion of its existence was sufficient to call into play the impulse of submission.

The rank and file of the armies of Frederick the Great were made up of peasants and the riff-raff of Europe. At one time it is said that over seventy per cent of his soldiers were foreigners. I am inclined to believe the resort to the cane was often but the suggestion to overawe rather than an appeal to fear. You must talk to men in a language they understand. Kipling's recruit, who came from "God knows where," probably got the kind of treatment adapted to raise in his mind, in the shortest time, the idea of submission. Be-

ing kicked around by the company was talk in a language he understood. I recently read a traveler's experience in a strange land and among a loutish soldiery. It became necessary for a petty officer to send a man with a message. The petty officer gave the man the message, and then knocked him down, as he explained, to impress upon him the importance of delivery. Some such notion was probably at the bottom of the brutality which characterized the old forms of discipline. The part of this which was efficient and did work was the suggestion of power, which could and would compel submission to an ordered routine of living which is the basis of habit-getting.

Soldiers are usually young men fresh from the restraints of home and the influence of its environments. Their veneer of habit is superficial and not deep-set. Grouped together they are deprived of the usual restraints that keep them subordinate, orderly, and industrious. Some positive restraining influence must be felt. This is furnished by any system in which disorder, disobedience, and sloth are severely and impartially punished. When men are certain that every dereliction will be discovered and promptly punished, a cool calculation of results is usually sufficient to keep them within proper bounds.

When it comes to the business of fighting, the background of physical force as a means of con-

trol is more important than ever. War is an inferno of hardships and agony. Its nervous shocks and excitements tend to break up all settled habits, and in this disarrangement the whole equipment of a man's moral habits may disappear. It is necessary to hold him with an iron hand, not only to avert panics, but also to prevent barbaric excesses.

We are concerned with the ability to mould human nature by suppressing or controlling the instinct of fear. Military training is much interested in creating ways and means of overcoming terror.

All soldiers need the courageous spirit which Socrates displayed during his trial, and which he described to his jury: "Wherever a man takes his post, deeming it best for him to be there or wherever the leader places him, there let him abide, say I, awaiting danger, taking account of naught, be it death or any other thing, except only dishonor."

The word "fear" is employed in so many different senses that its use leads to loose methods of thinking unless its meaning is accurately defined. Fear as an incident of the battlefield is a true instinct. The following definition is sufficiently accurate:

"The instinct of fear is a disposition which, when excited by one of its appropriate stimuli,

inclines us to experience a nervous shock, varying from a slight thrill to convulsions and insensibility. This is accompanied by an impulse to hide, or run away, sometimes to do both."

We have no appropriate name for this disposition, and usually describe it either in terms of its action or of its feeling. We speak of the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear. Both mean the same.

To run from danger is probably necessary for the survival of almost all species, and we find this instinct developed in all the higher animals. Its usual stimuli are strange sights and sounds.

The modern battlefield furnishes a maximum of terror-producing phenomena. The unusual sights and strange sounds are the starting-points. The natural animal fear at new experiences is augmented in man by his imagination, by the physiological changes that fear causes, and by the mental impression produced by seeing terror develop in others.

The eyes of the ordinary man facing the realities of battle are not dazzled by its adventurous, dramatic, or picturesque aspect. As the hostile fire becomes fiercer and nearer, the tension on the nerves is intense, and danger seems to grow greater and nearer. As soon as men become thoroughly frightened, their attention is absorbed in the cause of their fear and their habits tend to

become disorganized.

Among the thousands of rifles picked up on the field after the battle of Gettysburg, hundreds were found to contain many charges, some were loaded to the muzzles. Soldiers had gone through the motions of loading and firing, omitting to place a cap under the hammer. Their excitement had been so intense that they had not noticed that the rifle failed to go off when the trigger was pulled.

Among the responses to fear, of military interest, are the physiological changes which Professor Cannon explains as nature's way of preparing the body to do more efficient work. There is substantial truth in the adage, "Terror lends wings to flight." This release of energy, and the changes which accompany it, are quite likely to increase fear unless understood and guarded against. The outer manifestations of these changes are shivering, trembling, opening eyes and mouth, changes in breathing and heart-beats, sweating, diminished actions of the salivary glands affecting speech, and involuntary excretions. It is mortifying for an officer to have his voice fail or to show any of the other signs of fear. These outer manifestations are harmless if properly regarded, and they soon disappear as soon as the surplus energy released begins to be absorbed in work. Until such a time an officer must bluff, if it is necessary to conceal his emotions. There is even consola-

tion in the thought that the changes taking place indicate that a reservoir of reserve power has been tapped, and is pouring forth streams of energy which a strong will may utilize to lift one to higher levels of ability.

The discomforts arising from the physiological changes caused by the emotion of fear have a tendency to increase fear, unless we school ourselves to inhibit their reacting upon the mind. The process by which these effects of fear increase original fear is simple. A soldier has stored in his memory various images in regard to the dangers of battle. As he approaches the zone of fire, these images come into consciousness and thoughts of danger dominate the mind. As a result of this thinking, he experiences more or less trepidation, according to his disposition, which causes the various bodily changes referred to. His mind notes these changes, and that they are disturbing, and this tends to increase the discordant thinking already going on in his mind. His first mental state is one of anxiety and worry caused by his surroundings. To this is now united a second mental state of anxiety and worry, caused by what is going on within his own body. The second and first mental states unite to increase and intensify his emotion of fear, and the combination tends to produce more physical changes and disturbances, and the process may go on indefinitely,

until the man is panic-stricken, or even killed by fright.

I am now speaking, not of the means of suppressing the first mental state, but of inhibiting the second mental state, and preventing the union of the two which starts the indefinite process of fear augmentation. One can easily prevent this increase in the flux of fear, by thinking in the right way about what is happening to himself. I have already indicated what is the right way of thinking. If, when the soldier becomes conscious of the bodily changes excited by fear, he says to himself, "This is where the plug comes out and I am getting a dose of increased energy," he will indulge in the kind of thinking which stops the process of manufacturing new emotions out of the bodily changes which are so disturbing when their causes and utility are not understood.

You are familiar with the story of Turenne, who before his first battle apostrophized his trembling legs, saying, "You would tremble more if you only knew where I am going to take you this day." The story is usually told to illustrate the control of a weak body by a bold mind. Turenne's legs were all right, they wobbled a bit at the inflow of released energy when his adrenals got into action.

A moderate amount of fear is thrilling. There is a fascination in its challenge to combat, and an elation in the consciousness of strength called into

play by its advent. Mountain-climbing and polar explorations are not undertaken entirely for scientific advancement. They have in them an element which is displayed by the daring kid who enjoys the thrill of running in front of and just clearing an automobile.

From the military point of view, fear is the most undesirable instinct. All training attempts to eliminate it. This is done by reinforcing a rival instinct, creating hostile habits, or developing convictions which tend to suppress fear.

The great rival instinct to fear is pugnacity. We have discussed its utility in developing a first-class fighting man. Its fighting edge grows dull without practice. In 1745, the Stuart Pretender over-ran Scotland and a large part of northern England with a small force of wild Highlanders. The trained bands of the English militia could make no headway against them. Adam Smith, the political economist, made a study of the situation and came to the conclusion that a commercial State like England is an easy prey without the protection of a standing army. He says:

"In a militia the character of the laborer, artificer, or tradesman predominates over that of the soldier greatly to the detriment of the service." He meant to emphasize the fact that the fighting spirit tends to atrophy in peaceful pursuits. A man engrossed in business never thinks

of war otherwise than as a calamity. He has no sympathy with and does not understand a daring nature that loves fighting and finds satisfaction in the passions and perils of battle. He never voluntarily becomes a soldier, or willingly submits to military training except under the stress of deep emotions. A nation so engrossed may in time lose the ability to arouse a warlike spirit and become helpless against the attacks of an aggressive and war-like people. Adam Smith recognized this danger. He had no faith in citizen soldiers and recommended reliance upon discipline. The early Romans counted upon the fighting instinct and discipline. They trained all their citizens to develop both. Later they depended upon mercenaries and in due course this became their undoing. In the German military scheme the fighting instinct is encouraged and disciplined among the officers, while the rank and file are held by the forces of habit. In this country we in theory rely upon the fighting spirit of a well disciplined militia. The militia is not well disciplined, and there is a tendency to seek to free ourselves from all pugnacity as a relic of barbarism. Let danger, however, threaten the republic and we promptly hear a clamor for the "Spirit of '76." I suppose we are invoking the pugnacious spirit of Massachusetts which got us into the Revolution.

Beside pugnacity there are other rival instincts

that dominate the mind and exclude fear. I have often heard the summer people on Cape Ann speak of the brave sailors who man the fishing fleet. These visitors are impressed by the toll of death taken by the sea and the apparent indifference of the men who face its perils. The usual explanation is that the fishermen get used to danger and cease to fear. We often hear it said a man may get used to the idea of being hung or shot and go through the process as calmly as a North American Indian took his torture at the stake. What happens in all these cases is that a conviction of what manhood demands takes possession of the mind and regulates conduct to conform to the standard a man approves. The instinct of self-assertion triumphs over the instinct of fear. The captain of the sinking ship who saves some of his passengers and goes down with the rest does not act from any religious motive, from any hope of reward, or fear of punishment, he does it because he is a man, and behind his manhood is a natural impulse which dominates fear.

Military discipline is a great barrier against fear. It reinforces the instinct of pugnacity, and creates habits and convictions hostile to fear. When officers and men become proficient in team play, they acquire confidence in themselves and in one another, which creates an aggressive purpose

that minimizes the influence of conditions which produce fear and panic in untrained bodies.

Men who have been practiced in, and are accustomed to service and battle conditions, automatically respond and do the things required by the situation in which they find themselves. Under the stress of excitement, if they have been trained to do the proper things, their stored-up momentum keeps them going in the right direction, and the successive correct movements occur at the right time and in the regular sequence in which they have been learned. One action touches off the nerve excitation which prompts the next act in the sequence. I have heard it said that fear is always the child of incompetency.

Discipline is much like an old-fashioned musket, in which the come-back is the biggest part of its action. By this I mean certain sentiments grow from discipline and the right kind of training. Men begin to estimate themselves as soldiers and to assume the obligations which go with the profession. They accept a standard as their ideal. Pride demands that they fulfill the role they have assumed, so, when called upon to face dangers or privations, their self-esteem revolts at showing the white feather. They are controlled by an impulse to play up to their estimation of themselves, and to that ideal which they believe is the standard to which their actions should conform. Every pro-

fessional man knows the shame of not doing his best in a case he has undertaken—the shame of doing things which ought not to be done, and not doing things which ought to be done. We all play to and expect the applause of some gallery; the higher the upward swing, the more refined the gallery becomes, until the play is made for the approval of a refined self that knows and sits in just judgment.

Strong convictions have a tendency to inhibit fear. The government of every warring nation justifies its participation in war as necessary for the defense of its people, their liberties, or rights. An appeal of this kind is always made to arouse the fighting spirit and anger of the people. This appeal is echoed in many forms throughout the land. I will cite one example showing how stirring such a plea is when made from the heart. The following is an excerpt from an English paper:

“At a Memorial Service held yesterday at Glasslough, County Monaghan, for the late Captain Norman Leslie, of the Rifle Brigade, the Primate of Ireland, who delivered a brief address, read the following extract from a letter written by the gallant officer to a friend:

“‘Try and not worry too much about the war, units and individuals cannot count. Remember, we are writing a new page of history. Future

generations cannot be allowed to read the decline of the British Empire and attribute it to us. We live our little lives and die. To some are given chances of proving themselves men and to others no chance comes. Whatever our individual faults, virtues, or qualities may be it matters not; when we are up against big things let us forget individuals and let us act as one great British unit, united and fearless. Some will live and many will die, but count the loss naught, it is better far to go out with honor than survive with shame.' "

There is much of military value in the history of martyrs. A noble army in the early days of the Christian Church faced torture and death without signs of fear. The ordinary avenues of appeal by which the instinct of fear is aroused were closed by a faith which counted present suffering as nothing compared with future glory. Many authentic accounts of fierce torture and fine courage have come down to us from the first three centuries. Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch in the beginning of the second century, and on his way to martyrdom, wrote:

"Grant me nothing more than I may be poured out a libation to God. Come fire and iron, and grapplings with wild beasts, cuttings and manglings, wrenching of bones, breaking of limbs, crushing of the whole body, come cruel tortures of the Devil to assail me! Only be it mine to

attain unto Jesus Christ. I write you in the midst of life eagerly longing for death."

The mental element in the situation making this fine courage possible was the fact that attention was diverted from physical agony and fixed on glory.

Fear depends much upon our habits of thinking. Two women walking along a country road may unexpectedly come upon a group of cows. One woman may be frightened and the other experience no shock. This difference is probably due to the habitual thinking of each in reference to cows. The thinking of one about cows has been thoughts of fear, and these ideas now recur to her. The thinking of the other has been habitually turned in another direction. She has perhaps owned and cared for cows; she thinks of cows as useful animals, etc., etc. These ideas now recur to her, and she may be interested or even pleased at the meeting.

The way we think about things is often a matter of habit and education, and the right habit of thinking can be created by continuous right thinking. The right kind of thinking for a fighting man is the kind in which the thought of fear has no place.

When the Anglo-Saxon warrior drew his sword, he had no thought of fear, or care for wounds or death. Life was as dross. He went to battle with

determination as one sang:

"I will not budge. I mean to live or die by my lord's side; near this man, whom I love so much, I keep my word, the word I gave, the promise that I spoke. Return we two, together safe and sound, or both lie in the midst of carnage, dead."

From such accounts as have come down to us it would seem as if our Anglo-Saxon ancestors had well-nigh eliminated fear from among their fighting men. They did this by education, and when that failed by sanguinary methods. They suppressed the coward by killing him. Education consisted in moulding men to the standards set by custom, and in developing a self-respect which furnished an imperative motive to conform to standards.

Contempt of danger is instilled by the right kind of thinking. Great captains have always attempted to create this sentiment among their soldiers. At Kolin, Frederick the Great said with a sneer to a faltering regiment, "Do you fellows expect to live forever?"

The soldier without fear always fascinates and charms. He is extolled as a model and made the type of imitation. Historians write as follows about his fine quality of courage:

"At the close of the battle of Waterloo, the first regiment of Grenadiers of the Guard, four

in every ten of whom belonged to the Legion of Honor, left the battlefield in step and at their usual pace defying attacks. They were the élite of the élite; they had been taught to look with scorn upon fear and panic, and now, in the chaos of defeat, they remained as true to their leader, and to themselves, as they would have done, had they just won a great and glorious victory."

This attitude of the Old Guard toward danger was all a matter of being trained to the right kind of thinking and acting, and of finding this satisfactory. The thinking which they did about themselves as soldiers was always in terms of daring and courage. They practiced the methods of the brave lady who refused to think about cows in terms of terror, and thereby always felt comfortable and serene in their presence.

There is a kind of thinking which can be practiced until it ripens into a disposition which, in times of danger, automatically paralyzes the avenues over which the ordinary excitations of fear reach the brain. In an extreme form it can be carried so far that men pass through physical torture without the sensation of pain. The North American Indian at the stake and the Christian martyrs are examples of men whose natures were steeled against fear, and many of them appear not to have suffered physical pain.

The professional spirit tends to inhibit fear.

It focuses attention upon doing. The responsibility of an officer for the direction and control of his part of a fighting machine demands a mental alertness in reference to everything going on and a continual adaptation of means to ends. He may be so absorbed in this as to view the events of battle in a detached and impersonal way.

A reporter, writing of his experience in the summer of 1914 on the western battle-front in Europe, says, that he saw an English battery put out of action by the superior accuracy of the German fire. It happened quickly. The battery commander, not frightened but surprised by the suddenness of the disaster, exclaimed in astonishment, "I'll be damned if I don't call that fine work."

Absorption in work and attention to its details on the battlefield always give the appearance of courage. As it is not human nature to pay attention to two things at once, one cannot attend to the business of defeating the enemy and being afraid of him at the same time.

You may remember a recent American general who, falling on the firing line, exclaimed with surprise, "My God, they got me." He was said not to have known fear. His professional mind was so occupied with directing the attack that there was no room in it for consideration of personal safety.

Attention is the response of the nervous system

to one sensation to the total or partial exclusion of others. Thinking of what you will do to the enemy, and what he will do to you, are two thoughts of such opposite character that they cannot possibly occupy the mind at the same time; keeping one at the focus of attention necessarily excludes the other. General Grant had a rule expressing this principle which underlies military education. In his first battle experience as commander, his mind was much taken up with distress over what the other fellow was going to do to him, until he discovered the other fellow was beset with similar forebodings. After that he devoted his whole energy to what he was going to do to the other fellow, and found the subject so engrossing that he never paid attention to what might happen to himself. To be able to apply this rule, one must have professional knowledge and training.

General Grant, in his "Personal Memoirs," has described how he learned to apply this rule. In the early part of the war his regiment was ordered to disperse a force of Confederates commanded by a Colonel Harris. After telling of his uneasiness during his first day's march through a country deserted by its inhabitants, he describes the events of the second day as follows:

"As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris's camp,

and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do. I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view, I halted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before was still there, and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable."

Whether we depend upon a rival instinct to preëempt the field against fear, the reaction of habit to keep us on the right track, or self-respect to hold us to ideals of conduct, the effect is always one of diverting attention from fear and concentration of efforts upon useful actions.

A mass of men engaged in a common undertaking and influenced by the same emotions are pow-

erfully stimulated by the actions and feelings of their comrades. A man with a few companions in the presence of danger is apt to show less fear than when he confronts the same situation as one of a crowd. The presence of others showing fear has a tendency to increase the terror of their comrades.

The confusion of battle upsets organized habits and narrows their ordinary reactions. Somewhere in the series of nervous reactions which constitute habit, a path fails to open and a nervous excitation goes astray. We saw that many soldiers at Gettysburg slipped a cog somewhere in their habits, and went through the motions of loading and firing without capping their pieces. Besides disorganizing habits, danger has a tendency to limit the power of personal control and direction. A man loses his head, and with it goes initiative. Although his powers and habits are shattered, he still realizes that the situation calls for immediate action. In this dilemma of indecision, the actions of his companions are suggestions which frequently become turning-points in decision. Each man doing the same thing repeats the suggestion and increases its volume. The strength of a suggestion depends upon its frequency, repetition, and the imposing source from which it comes. A crowd actuated by similar emotions is in itself imposing, and has a tendency to call into play the instinct

of subordination. Before the mass of suggestions piled up by the actions and feelings which he perceives in his comrades, a man is unable, in the excitement of battle, to pass personal judgment or to resist. He accepts a lead and is swept with the crowd to heights of valor or depths of ignominy. In the early days of the first French Republic, when attacks were delivered in lines of half-battalion columns, a few resolute officers and non-commissioned officers at the end of each column carried a mass of conscripts to victory.

A panic is started in the same way if the volume of suggestions favors fear. Captain LeRoy Eltinge says:

"A soldier on the firing line, with his attention fixed on the enemy with such intensity as to distract it from all else; with the continuous roar of the battle, and his limited range of vision; with his movements limited for considerable spaces of time to those necessary to the manipulation of the rifle—in the supports and reserves not even that; with the blank mind that always attends fear, fulfills all the conditions to be ripe for the receipt of suggestion."

The subject of panics is usually discussed under the head of mob psychology. If we study these discussions we shall read much about the mob mind and the inferior mentality, vacillation, irresponsibility, and susceptibility of a crowd. The

use of this vocabulary sounds learned, but it is not very helpful in explaining the phenomenon. The loss of self-control and the breaking-up of habits plus the example of others are the causes of panics. In the excitement of battle it is human nature to lose one's head and to accept a lead or that lead which seems to be favored by a majority. Once committed to leadership, the gregarious instinct is involved, and the elation of acting with others is a stimulus which sweeps men along. Soldiers often say that when in battle they have felt as if they were in a dream. We are familiar with the amount of irrational thinking and acting which takes place in dreams. The fellow who dreamed of playing the part of undertaker and corpse at his own funeral is an example. As we drift in dreams without the control and direction of our whole personality, so in battle the orderly working of the mind is limited. We are less rational because upset, and more susceptible to a lead because less rational. In such a state the remarks or actions of a coward, or a number of them, give the unfortunate suggestion which starts a panic.

The fact that untrained men are more susceptible to panic suggests the means of control. Intensive training develops the fighting instinct and reinforces it by desirable habits. It is this kind of training which enables soldiers to go at their work as a colony of bees or ants tackle a

job, in obedience to an impulse which is a law of their nature.

It is the officer's business to insist upon this intensive training and to develop the proper fighting morale in times of peace; and in war to sustain its physical basis by proper food, clothing, and care; to help men overcome fear by counter-suggestions and to suppress with firmness the first tendency to panic. Practising General Grant's rule and cultivating the professional attitude are the best prophylactic treatments for panic.

I have repeatedly referred to the professional attitude of officers. Fighting can be made as simple as letter-writing. When I write a word, I think of it, put the point of my pencil to paper and guide it across the paper. Somehow the letters seem to form themselves without effort on my part. An officer, by training in assuming situations and solving military problems, acquires the habit of making correct responses to situations. An image of a new situation tends to reproduce mental processes which have been used before in handling like problems. Practice and experience store the mind with ideas and images of problems and their solutions. A real situation in war is an appeal to this fund of organized experiences, and touches off the train of responses calculated and adapted to solve the problem. When an officer is called upon to solve a new problem, he first tries

to understand it. In doing this he classifies it by reference to some past experience. When classified, various solutions arise in his mind according to the richness of his former experience. The solution which occurs to him and which harmonizes best with all the facts of the present situation is accepted by him. The professional attitude is only possible to an officer whose past experience has been enriched by solving problems, and whose mind has in this way become organized to classify and solve new experiences that he meets in battle. If an officer is so trained, it is possible for any problem so to engross his attention that he becomes immune to the ordinary sensations causing fear and panic. At the fall of Syracuse, Archimedes was said to have been so intent upon solving a problem in Greek fire that he was killed in the midst of his study, not having noticed that the walls were breached and that the enemy had entered the city.

XII

PREPAREDNESS AND THE MILITIA

SOME years ago Lieutenant General John M. Schofield told us why we always have been unprepared for war. Speaking of the necessity of general military education in a country having a popular government he said:

"No man can be fully qualified for the duties of a statesman until he has made a thorough study of the science of war in its broadest sense. He need not go to a military school, much less serve in the army or in the militia. But unless he makes himself thoroughly acquainted with the methods and conditions requisite to success in war, he is liable to do almost infinite damage to his country. There is no possible remedy for such evils as this country has suffered except general military education. In my opinion no man is fit for a seat in Congress unless he has such an education.

"The most serious questions upon which a free people can be called to vote are, a question of war, a question of preparation for war, and a question of approval and support, or disapproval

and condemnation, of an administration on account of the mode in which war has been conducted. Can this highest duty of the citizen be intelligently performed without military education? A sovereign individual regards this as demanding the highest education and the ablest counsel he can possibly obtain. Can sovereign millions do it wisely without any education whatever? I believe no proposition could possibly be plainer than that general military education is indispensable to good citizenship in this country, and especially to all who may be intrusted with high responsibilities in the legislative and executive departments of the national government. If there is one offense in this country which ought never, under any circumstances, to be pardoned it is ignorance in those who are trusted by the people to manage the affairs of their government."

We can apply this to our practice of filling offices from heads of departments to junior subalterns with untried men. We are chiefly concerned in these lectures with the education of company officers. The time period necessary to create officers, develop a system of training to turn out soldiers, and create an army is not so generally understood in this country that there is a public opinion demanding appropriate legislation. We hear a great deal said about a brave American people rising overnight in defense of their liber-

ties. Public opinion is in a formative process. It is your duty as a citizen to help create a healthy tone and a demand for the application of correct methods. You have learned in your short experience that it is easy to teach the routine of drill and the use of weapons in a comparatively short period, but that it takes time to create self-reliance, the spirit of faith, good comradeship, and the confidence which is the soul of an army. Most men must be born again before they learn to forget self and acquire the will to be subordinate. A revolutionary adjustment of values is necessary. Much time must be consumed in the process of character building, organizing experience, and developing an initiative coordinated with subordination.

Kipling has intimated a belief that it takes three years to turn a "gutter snipe" into a soldier. Recent training in England suggests an unwillingness to trust recruits in the trenches until they have something more than a year's training. In a time of public stress and enthusiasm the period of training can be somewhat reduced, because conditions increase interest, energy and enthusiasm to make ready.

We vie with each other in extolling the character of Washington. We say he was preeminent for clear insight and just judgments. He began a war with untrained levies, and he brought it to

a close with a small body of trained Continentals helped by French regulars and a fluctuating mob of militia. No military leader ever had a richer experience or was better qualified to judge how long it takes to turn our citizens into soldiers able to stand against the regulars of a military power. He says, "To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month or even a year." Speaking out of the fullness of his experience he gives the following reasons as the grounds of his belief.

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.

"Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodgings, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control can-

not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign."

The United States has never attempted universal training. We have just begun to think about it. We have no system or organization for this work or the corps of officers and school masters necessary to begin training millions. We have little experience in our own past to guide us. We do not know what standards are practical, or how much time it will require to make the average American into a first-class soldier. Our military authorities make professional guesses at this, but their suggestions are materially influenced by what they think the country will stand for. What period of training we finally adopt will depend upon public opinion. There is great danger of underestimating the problem and attempting too little, unless public opinion is educated to appreciate the difficulties of making a soldier and how long it takes. There is no such thing as partial defense in modern war. If our preparation is not complete our time and money will have been wasted. I have no faith in the judgment of inexperienced prophets who bid us trust in the courage and resolution of untrained citizens. I prefer the calm judgment of Washington, the man who tried out our untrained citizens and knew.

It is my judgment that from twelve to eighteen months of intensive training under competent instructors and a proper system is necessary to turn out first-class soldiers. Something less than the best training may do for fighting in Cuba, Mexico, or the Philippines. It depends upon the character and training of the enemy.

It will take a long time to develop a corps of officers capable of training a large army. They are the models to suggest ideals and instil a courageous spirit of invincibility. They must acquire the combination of knowledge, experience, and character which dominates conduct, inspires confidence, and a willingness to accept a lead.

The report of the SPECIAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY EDUCATION AND RESERVE which reported to the Massachusetts Legislature of 1916 emphasizes the requirements of officers and the length of time necessary for their proper preparation. It says:

"The education and training of officers is a very different matter. This is not a question of months but of years. It must be approached on a basis as nearly like that for the education of a lawyer, doctor, or other professional man as is possible.

"To-day war is fought upon such a large scale that a high degree of intelligence and initiative is demanded from every officer. Officers to-day

must know how to feed their men, guard them against sickness, and bring them in the best physical condition upon the firing line. They must have an expert knowledge in the matters of directing and controlling fire, and of leading men under service conditions. This involves a scientific knowledge and a long training and preparation both in company administration and troop leading.

"Expert knowledge on the part of an officer to be available must be organized. By this is meant such mental adjustment in the memory of past experiences as will enable him to classify new problems by comparison with past problems and bring to their solution his accumulated skill. To be an efficient officer a man's memory must be stored with a rich experience before he can be trusted to make prompt, accurate and correct decisions.

"Besides this expert skill, an officer must be equipped with the professional attitude towards his work which inhibits other forms of mental activity from interfering with the application of his full powers. The professional attitude is one of concentrated attention in which all thoughts are centered upon adjusting the means at hand to accomplish a definite purpose.

"Besides concentrating his own powers, an officer must control and dominate the men he

leads. His value as an officer depends upon his ability to nerve men to great efforts and sacrifices. To accomplish this he must acquire in some manner the prestige which makes one a leader of men. To these qualities he must add another,—that of pleasure in his work. He must find in it an opportunity for self-expression in a way which he thinks worth while.

“The problem of the education of officers in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of an increased regular army and militia force is perhaps the most important single feature of preparation for national defense.

“The Federal Government must take the lead and show the way, while the states fall into line in cooperation. Nevertheless, it should be recognized by the States that to turn out a large enough number of efficient officers will tax heavily the higher educational resources of the country.”

At the beginning of a war against a first-class power our militia system will break down and its defects become apparent. It will fail in discipline, training, numbers, equipment, and energy. There are four radical defects in our system.

1. Election of officers in the militia.—Wherever the elective system touches the militia there is the atmosphere of servility, common in the relation of politicians to constituents. An officer should not be the servant of his men. He

should be their schoolmaster and commander. The servant of the State, if you please, but the master of his men to direct, control, and compel. He is not an autocrat. He is not, however, responsible to his juniors, but to his seniors; to be kind, firm, and just to his subordinates, and to see that his command is trained and ruled according to law and made fit as a fighting machine. Wherever the elective system prevails in military organizations it undermines and corrupts discipline. It makes officers responsible in the wrong direction—seniors to juniors and officers to men. This tends to mob rule.

If we consider an officer in the character of an instructor whose duty it is to set standards which he has received from sources which the men have not yet reached, it becomes apparent that untrained men are incapable of judging the qualifications requisite in a man who is to exercise command. You never knew a school where the student-body was permitted to elect the headmaster and his assistants.

2. Voluntary enlistments in the militia.—It is the inability in the militia to compel obedience by punishment, that awakens among regulars a distrust as to the value of our training. The militia's theory of service is a voluntary enrollment to learn in a limited time what we can of military duties, and that a volunteer does not need the

stimulus of punishment as an effective appeal. Our volunteer system gives a minimum of military efficiency. The majority of the enlisted men enroll, attend a few drills, or a camp, and disappear. The time of officers, instead of being devoted to instruction, is dissipated in drumming up recruits or creating social whirls to make enlistments attractive.

A military training, to be efficient, must be sufficiently intensive to create the necessary set in the nervous system which constitutes discipline. There are not enough men in the community willing to undergo this training in times of peace to make a respectable showing in the militia. As a result the militia flirts with discipline. We are unwilling to admit to ourselves that men will not enlist for an intensive training, or stand for it after enlisting, unless behind our system there is a power able to overawe and hurt. The notion of conscription for militia duty is odious in some quarters. This must be either because we believe such duty unnecessary, or are unwilling to do our part as a contribution to the common defense. If neither reason is true, we would regard conscription as merely a way of determining by lot who shall have the privilege of serving. We need a law which will send a sufficient number of recruits to the colors and compel their attendance at all drills and tours of duty. The law would not

work any hardships upon the youngsters who make up the militia. It would probably be a mere background suggestion, sufficient to accomplish its purpose, because it would furnish the necessary incentive to secure attendance.

The volunteer system has proved uncertain in furnishing requisite numbers. In a militia where recruits are secured by non-military attractions and held together by a social cement, the serious preparation for war is an incident rather than the real purpose of the organizations. A low standard of efficiency and the atmosphere of a frolic are often thought necessary to attract recruits. Throughout this State we have built armories. The militia units need schoolrooms for theoretical instruction and storerooms for equipments, but the place for training is in the open. We furnish dance-halls, pool-rooms and club-rooms to make the service attractive and to entice recruits. This may tend to interest men in pool, billiards, or the fox-trot, but it is little effective in making soldiers. It is the wrong kind of an appeal. You wonder why more people are not interested in the militia. I think a partial explanation lies in a notion that the militia is too much a social organization and that the means adopted to make it popular repel serious-minded youngsters. Our methods do not capitalize the instincts whose responses make soldiers.

Voluntary enlistments must be coupled with some form of conscription to insure full ranks, the orderly working of any system of instruction, and the disappearance of the old time frolic spirit.

3. Lack of central control in the militia.—In balancing the distribution of power over the militia between the various states and central government we have diffused control. This is wholly vicious. The war powers of a government, including preparation for war, should be centralized for efficiency. We have not done this. Congress provides for arming, organizing, and disciplining the militia, but the business of doing this is left to independent and sovereign states. The states do much or little as they please. They are irresponsible agents. Any one of them can thwart the purpose of the central government. They are repeatedly doing this. The mailed fist of national control is a stuffed glove. It has no means of enforcing discipline or imposing a system of training. Efficient preparation requires the control by a central power and responsibility to that power alone. An organization with a divided allegiance cannot be made military.

The militia under our present system is a hodgepodge of forty odd insignificant armies without central control. The head of each little army is a governor not expected to possess military qualifications. They are not responsible to the Presi-

dent in a military sense for the proper equipment or discipline of the troops. If the militia have enough on their backs to satisfy the requirements of a parade, and sufficient to get a small command through a week's outing within easy reach of abundant markets, there is no complaint. The states are satisfied, and it is not the business of the Federal Government to prepare the militia. When we are called upon to double our forces for war, the lack of forethought in the matter of equipment is apparent. We at once hear a clamor about soldiers denied the necessities of life. The enlisted men and their friends usually elect the regimental officers as scapegoats. This tends to weaken discipline. Officers begin to step lightly and shirk responsibility. The real fault lies in our lack of system.

In most states the militia are cadres, intended in case of necessity to be expanded to a maximum of strength. We maintain companies at a minimum, and in an emergency, which calls for trained men and not recruits, we increase the quantity and weaken the quality by adding untrained men. We get additional men in any old way. Nothing is prearranged for expansion or for making good losses which are sure to occur.

State troops in reference to their degree of preparedness are in all stages of evolution. Assembled they would resemble a machine put to-

gether from odd parts of different makes never intended to go together, and for work they would be about as valuable. Like a chain they would be as strong as the weakest link. The men who serve in the militia are not to blame for this. The system of control and responsibility is so radically wrong that under it there is no hope of efficiency.

4. An amateur military force.—Our military weakness in war has been caused by a reliance upon untrained troops commanded by inexperienced officers. Early in the Revolution General Knox serving with Northern militia, wrote to his wife, "The militia get sick, or think themselves so, and run home." General Henry Lee who served with Southern militia, wrote, "A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and disciplined for battle." Knox writing on the spur of the moment blamed the militia. Lee writing after the war and with mature deliberation blamed the system and the Government for tolerating a vicious system. Both saw that no dependency could be placed upon untrained masses.

It is often claimed that members of the militia have not the time for the intensive training necessary to make soldiers. If the militia is to be made efficient time must be taken to do the necessary

work. The present low efficiency raises false hopes especially among those, who hold to the belief, expressed by one of the early Presidents that, "A well disciplined militia is our best reliance in peace and for the first movements in war, till regulars may relieve them." It is not a case where half a loaf is better than no bread. The militia of the United States have never been well disciplined, and as at present organized never will be until months after they are called into service. For the first movement against a well organized enemy their employment would merely increase the sum total of suffering and loss, would arouse passions and resentments which lead to reprisals, and would not appreciably postpone national disaster.

Whenever the militia have been mustered into the service of the United States almost half have been recruits, a large percentage of the remainder have had only a year's service or less, and a very small percentage have attended the full number of drills for a single period of enlistment. The aggregate of these drills amounts only to a few hours of military work. Such a force is utterly unreliable for immediate use. Of course they can be whipped into shape but this takes time. Time is something that an invasion by an aggressive and prepared enemy does not allow, unless we can secure allies behind whose defensive lines ade-

quate preparation can be made.

I am frequently asked, why I have trained so long in the militia and urge you to do the same, if I think it inefficient. A short answer is that, however deficient one may believe the militia, there are in its ranks many who desire to prepare themselves for service, and see no other way in which they can get training. They cling to a hope that somehow and at some time a military policy will be adopted by the United States which will make for efficiency.

The hope for the militia is federalization and universal training. The fairest way to secure recruits is national service and a call by classes to the colors. A short time ago such hope was futile. In the last few years public opinion has changed. We are gradually approaching a conviction that universal training is desirable and may be necessary. Our people are profoundly stirred by the events taking place in Europe. We are rudely awakened from a comfortable belief that war is an anomalous condition. It is gradually dawning upon us that our past immunity from war has been an anomaly, and that in the future we must expect to be involved in military complications with our neighbors. We see in Europe a great nation splendidly organized and equipped for war, acting under a leadership apparently determined to impose its rule upon a large part of

the world. The idea behind our system of government is freedom of action, opinion, and conduct. We revolt at the spirit of aggression which we think is behind the European war. We feel that it is contrary to all our ideas and modes of life, and begin to think that there is in it the possibility of danger to our own institutions.

A fisherman friend asked me what I thought the prospect was of our getting mixed up in the European war. Yankee-like I tried to answer the question by asking others which would develop his opinion. He told me that as a fisherman he knew something about the habit of lobsters: that at certain seasons lobsters shed their shells, and that during this process they hide themselves in sea-weed and kelp, because, without the protection of their shell armor, they are liable to be eaten by their brothers and sisters. The richer and juicier a lobster is when moulting, the more attractive he becomes to his predatory neighbors. My fisherman friend said that he thought New York, Boston, and other Eastern cities, in our present state of unpreparedness, must look like juicy lobsters to some of our neighbors. Some such notion is becoming a fixed conviction, and we are developing a state of mind which recognizes that there is a meaning in the adage of our fathers, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

We are losing the fear that universal training

will create a military caste likely to threaten our liberties. We know that this kind of training has done nothing of the sort in France, Switzerland, or Australia. We are ceasing to believe that time devoted to military instruction interferes with industrial progress or is time wasted. We have seen Germany increase her commerce and industry by leaps and bounds, and we are beginning to suspect that the two years of military service which her young men undergo at a plastic period in their lives has something to do with this increased efficiency. Young men are not much of a factor in production until their habits and characters are formed, and army training takes them at a time when they are of little economic value. It increases their strength, health, and endurance, and adds a number of years of usefulness to the other end of their lives, and keeps them longer in the ring as producers. As long as the dangers of war did not seem imminent, our army was looked upon as a police force. A notion prevailed that a citizen performed his full military duty by paying taxes to hire people who enjoy being policemen or soldiers.

Nations do not act from altruistic motives. If the United States has anything in the way of wealth or possessions which an aggressive and powerful nation covets, there is a danger that that nation will help itself when the time is ripe

to do this with a fair prospect of success. A situation may arise any time calling upon us to defend our inheritance. When we come to believe this, our people will have little difficulty in adopting the principle of universal service, and insisting upon every citizen training for national defense in some field. We will federalize all our soldiers and establish some system which we think guarantees an adequate defense. We will adopt such a policy as soon as we believe it is necessary.

There is nothing in our habits and social conditions which ought to make universal training odious. We inherit the dislike of a standing army from our English ancestors because at the time of the Stuart restoration an English philosopher thought he had discovered that men are more powerfully controlled through fear than by any other method. This theory received royal approval, and in the Stuart scheme of government a standing army was the appropriate instrument to instil fear. Our Puritan fathers had little sympathy with this method of government. Lexington and Bunker Hill did not tend to remove this prejudice, yet they always believed in universal training and service, practiced it, and wrote their belief into the Constitution of Massachusetts.

Even under federalization and universal training I must warn you against being too sanguine of immediate results. It will take years to or-

ganize and develop a smooth running system. Germany worked up to her present standards only after years of experience. The foundation of the French defense was laid in a long period of training. The Swiss system had its beginning two hundred years before America was discovered.

When the time comes for forming a new army based upon federal control and universal training I expect the Guard of this State to render immense assistance. Many of you will become officers, many organizations will become absorbed, and in a few years most of you will have forgotten the militia.

The time has come for us to separate. We have spent a year studying human nature. We have seen that habits determine to a large extent what we care for and do; that our instincts are inherited habits, and that we build other habits upon these by development and acquisition; that character is habit, and that the underlying physical process of character-getting is organization in the nervous system of group paths to act together. These paths are old ones deepened, new ones opened, and all organized by practice. As ninety per cent or more of education consists in doing by which these paths are formed into systems, the emphasis on military training is placed upon an intensive doing, behind which stands a force which

tolerates no exceptions. Military education recognizes that we are slaves of instincts and habits, that efficiency depends upon this serfdom and the organization of tendencies to respond automatically and correctly to stimuli in the outer world. We have seen that the first fruit of discipline is subordination, yet in this submission is the beginning of a greater freedom, the power to spend one's self in a cause, and the ability to say, in the spirit of *Invictus*, "I am the Master of my fate—I am the Captain of my Soul."

Have you grasped this idea of discipline and the transformation that discipline makes? If you have, these lessons will bear fruit when public danger creates an occasion for moulding men in the iron frame of discipline.

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